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INTRODUCTION
The judiciary envisioned by the Constitution stood decidedly apart
from the political branches. James Madison had made quite clear the
dangers of the majority faction in a democracy,1 and the judiciary was
intended as one of the ways the new government could guard against
the excesses-the "wicked projects"-of a powerful majority.2 As Al-
exander Hamilton wrote, the judiciary "not only serves to moderate the
immediate mischiefs of [aws] but it operates as a check upon the legis-
lative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to an iniqui-
tous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, [will]
qualify their attempts."3
If those serving in the federal government generally were to be
those "whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacri-
fice it to temporary and partial considerations,"4 as Madison described
them, then those who sat on the judicial bench were surely to be the
cream of that crop.' They were, after all, appointed by the President,
confirmed by the Senate,6 and given terms for life or "Good Behav-
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law.
.See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 71-72 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
("Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens ... that
our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the
rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and anxious majority.").
2 See id. at 79; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) ("the courts of
justice are too be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative en-
croachments").
3 THE FEDERAI.IST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton).
4 THE FEDERAI.STNO. 10, at 76 Games Madison).
5 The Federalist No. 78 describes those the Framers hoped would serve as judges, and why
they should be given life tenure:
mhere can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to
qualify for the stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the ordi-
nary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite
the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge. These considerations apprise us
that the government can have no great option between fit characters; and that a tem-
porary duration in office which would naturally discourage such characters from quit-
ing a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench would have a tendency
to throw the administration of justice into hands less able and less well qualified to
conduct it with utility and dignity.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton).
6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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iour," whichever ended first.' The judiciary was to be insulated from
the swales of public reaction so that it could deliberate more intently on
the public good and justice.' As judicial codes across the land now re-
flect, the ideal was independence, integrity and impartiality.9
In the last twenty years, that ideal has been under attack on multi-
ple fronts. Thirty-nine states now subject judges to popular election ei-
ther to obtain or keep their seat.10 Money has poured into these races
such that expenditures have nearly tripled in the last decade, and most
of the money has come from large political organizations trying to im-
pose a particular ideology on the courts.'" There has been a concerted
attack on judicial code provisions aimed at depoliticizing the elections
and minimizing the effect of campaign contributions, and the Supreme
Court has stricken virtually all such provisions as First Amendment vio-
lations.'2 A few state legislatures have attempted public financing of
judicial elections in order to reduce the potential for corruption, but the
Court has stricken those efforts as well.'3 The complete politicization
of the judiciary has begun to appear inevitable.
Standing boldly in the midst of the onslaught is the Court's deci-
sion five years ago in Caperton v. Massey Coal Co. 4 The facts of the
Caperton case illustrate how far from the judicial ideal the country has
allowed itself to stray." The CEO of a West Virginia company who
7 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
8 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (judicial independence is nec-
essary to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from "the effects of those ill hu-
mors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dan-
gerous innovations... and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.').
9 Some version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted by all fifty
states, see infra note 23 and accompanying text, and the current 2007 version opens with "A
judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, at 15 (2011) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
10 See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 106-134 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
14 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
15 Much has been made of the similarities between the Caperton case and John Grisham's
novel, The Appeal. See Joan Biskuspic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA
TODAY (Feb. 16, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/wasington/2009-02-16-
grisham-courtN.htm. Grisham has said, however, that his novel was not based on the
Caperton case, but on the experience of a Mississippi judge. Joanne Doroshow, Watch Hot Coffee,
a Powerful New Film on HBO June 27, THE HUFFINGTON POST (une 26, 2011, 2:44 PM), http://
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suffered a $50 million trial verdict against it decided he had other op-
tions: he suddenly became the largest campaign contributor in the next
West Virginia Supreme Court election, saw his candidate elected, and
then obtained a reversal when the candidate he had placed on the
bench cast the deciding vote. Nothing in West Virginia law prevented
that development, 6 so the only possible remedy was a due process rul-
ing from the Supreme Court of the United States.
Five of the justices agreed that the newly elected judge's participa-
tion in the case could not be squared with the Constitution. The Court
recognized that its prior holdings on judicial bias had involved only
three limited situations, and the dissenters argued vehemently that no
extension of due process was called for. But the Court looked beneath
the factual settings of its precedent and emerged convinced that due
process requires a judge's disqualification when the circumstances raise
an undeniable likelihood of bias. And in so holding, the Court set forth
a far-reaching, probability-of-bias standard. On an allegation of bias,
the court should ask "whether the average judge in his position is 'like-
ly' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 'potential for
bias,"'17 and should include in that assessment "'a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness.""' 8
So the battle lines have been drawn in the war for judicial impar-
tiality. On one side, protected by the first amendment, are judicial elec-
tions complete with attack ads, multi-million dollar war chests filled by
potential litigants, and would-be judges committing ever more forceful-
ly to political views in order to stand out and gain monied supporters.
On the other side are the due process constraints on candidates once
they reach the bench, which under Caperton include an assessment of
the likelihood that the judge can remain impartial. The question is
whether Caperton is providing a counterweight in favor of impartiality
sufficient to balance the forces turning the judiciary into an entirely po-
litical domain. And if not, what more can be done?
www.huffingtonpost.com/joanne-doroshow/watch-hot-coffee-a-powerf b 884318.html.
There is a certain irony in the fact that Grisham had ready knowledge of another egregious
judge-buying case: i.e., Caperton apparently was not that unusual.
16 Under West Virginia law, in order to have the newly elected judge disqualified, Caperton
had to file a motion with the judge himself, and the judge alone made the decision that he
would not step aside. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873-74.
17 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 869 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66
(1971)).
18 Id. at 883 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
[Vol. 13:441
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This Article asserts that Caperton has had a very positive impact on
the state and federal judicial systems over the last five years-spurring
substantial procedural changes by a number of states and a much more
honest approach to judicial bias by the lower courts as a whole-but
that it will be hard to sustain such reform without a deeper commit-
ment from the Supreme Court itself. Part One acquaints the reader
generally with the regulatory framework that seeks to ensure judicial
impartiality, focusing particularly on the judicial codes of conduct and
disqualification provisions. Part Two sets forth the developments in re-
cent years that have contributed to the judiciary's politicization and
now operate to prevent reforms designed to ensure impartiality. Part
Three examines Caperton in depth and demonstrates how it has ad-
vanced impartiality within the state and federal judiciaries. Part Four fo-
cuses on the gap between the lower courts' efforts and the Supreme
Court's approach to disqualification and political activity, highlighting
the need for more leadership from our most closely observed judges.
I. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ENSURING IMPARTIALITY
WITHIN THE STATE AND FEDERALJUDICIARIES
Sitting judges in the United States, at both the state and federal
levels, are subject to two distinct sources of regulation requiring that
they aspire to act impartially. Most immediately, in the courtroom,
judges must operate within the bounds of disqualification rules, which
set forth specifically the situations in which a judge is required to recuse
himself or herself.9 Compliance with the disqualification laws is in-
voked by litigants in specific cases, and enforced by court review of
specific cases (at least in the jurisdictions where there is review).2"
Beyond the courtroom, judicial codes of conduct govern judges'
comportment in ways that are intended to further their ability to be im-
19 See infra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
20 Judicial ethics scholar Charles Gardner Geyh has written an important frameworking
piece identifying the three dimensions in which judicial impartiality is sought-the ethical, pro-
cedural, and political-and observing how each dimension serves a different constituency and
function. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judidal Impartially, 65 FI.A. L. REv. 493,
497-98 (2013). The section that follows here seeks to acquaint the reader with what Professor
Geyh would describe as regulation in the ethical and procedural dimensions-judicial codes of
conduct and disqualification law, respectively-primarily as background material for under-
standing the issues that Caperton and the proposals here present. Discussion of regulation in
what Professor Geyh would describe as the political dimension-provisions governing im-
peachment and removal-are beyond the scope of the piece.
2015]
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partial.2' These codes are generally enforced by commissions made up
of other judges within the given jurisdiction.22 The codes of conduct
applied to judges across the nation are not entirely uniform, but they
are quite similar. As of 2009, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
had adopted some version of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct.23 The federal Code of Conduct for United States Judges is like-
wise based on the ABA's Model Code,24 albeit an earlier version with
21 See infra notes 42-71 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
23 What is now the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct was first promulgated in 1924.
See MODEl. CODE, supra note 9, at xi. Called the Canons ofJudicial Ethics, and consisting of 36
principles, it was intended to be only a guide, an aspirational document, rather than any basis
for discipline. Many states, however, not only adopted the Canons, but transformed them into
law and established sanctions for their violation, noted in Randall T. Shepherd, Campaign .Speech:
Restraint and liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1065 n.26 (1996) (citing
Robert Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judidal Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410, 410 (1972)).
Forty-five years later, the ABA convened a Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Con-
duct under the direction of California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor, and in 1972, ap-
proved the first Code of Judicial Conduct designed to be enforceable, see Shepherd, supra, at xii
(citing LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 8 (1992)). There
have been two major revisions since that 1972 Code, one in 1990 and one in 2007. Currently
twenty-nine states have adopted a version of the 2007 Model Code, see, e.g., ABA Chart on Status
of State Review of Model Code, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsi
bility/resources/udicial-ethicsregulation/mcjc.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). This includes
Montana, which, prior to 2008, had not adopted any version of the ABA Model Code, but was
still adhering to the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. See Order, In re 2008 Montana Code of
Judicial Conduct, No. AF 08-0203, at 1-2 (Mont. Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/resources/judicial-ethics-reg
ulation/map.html. Three more states have proposed revisions in line with the 2007 Code, and
fifteen states have established committees to review their codes for updating. The remaining
four states appear to be content for the moment operating under the 1990 version of the Code.
24 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (the Judicial Conference of the United States is responsible for
setting the policy for the lower federal courts). See also ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 13-14,
1969 AND JUNE 10, 1969, at 41, 43, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Judicia
lConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/procee
dings/1969-03.pdf (in June 1969, in the wake of controversies involving Supreme Court Justice
Abe Fortas and Tenth Circuit federal district judge Stephen Chandler, Chief Justice Earl War-
ren convened the Conference for a special session to address judicial ethics, and the Conference
resolved to formulate standards of judicial conduct); and Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn,
The Federal Judiiay and the ABA Model Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUST. SyS. J. 271, 275
(2007) (within the same time frame, the ABA created the committee chaired by California Jus-
tice Traynor to create a model code, and asked the Judicial Conference to work with that com-
mittee in the review of the 1924 Canons and the drafting of the new code, and the Conference
agreed). This led the Judicial Conference to create its Committee on Codes of Conduct, and so
after the ABA approved the 1972 Model Code, it took little time for the Judicial Conference to
adopt the Code as well, see ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
different formatting. So for ease of reference and the reader's under-
standing, unless the particular discussion warrants greater specificity,
judicial code references here will be to the 2007 version of the ABA's
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2 with the corresponding provision of
the federal code, if it exists, provided in the footnote.
A. State and Federal Disqualification Provisions
In the federal system, judicial disqualification is governed by stat-
ute, primarily 28 U.S.C. 5 455. Subsections (a) and (b) of section 455 set
forth the substantive grounds for disqualification. Subsection (b) identi-
fies several specific recurring situations where disqualification is re-
quired:
(1) [the judge] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(2) [the judge] in private practice . . .served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom [the judge] previously practiced
law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the mat-
ter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness con-
cerning it;
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 5-6, 1973, at 10, available at
http:/ /www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?d
oc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1973-04.pdf. After the ABA proposed ma-
jor revisions to the Code in 1990, the Judicial Conference was slower to act on the ABA's work.
Ultimately-in September 1992-the Conference adopted the new Model Code, but this time
the Conference made several important changes. Most significantly, the Conference changed
the ABA's mandatory language in the Canons-the word "shall"-to the hortatory "should,"
see Lievense & Cohn, supra, at 278; see also ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 22, 1992, at
62 ("In August 1990, the American Bar Association approved a New Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. In light of this New Model Code, the Committee on the Codes of Conduct conduct-
ed a comprehensive review of the Judicial Conference's Code of Conduct for United States
Judges and recommended revisions to the Code.'), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Fed
eral Courts /J udicialConference/Proceedings /Proceedings.aspx?doc= /uscourts /FederalCourts/
judconf/proceedings/1992-09.pdf.
25 See Comparison of State Codes of Judicial Conduct to Model Code of Judicial Conduct, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/resources/judicial-ethics-reg
ulation/comparison.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (to the extent a reader wants to determine
whether a cited Model Code provision applies in his or her state, the portion of the ABA web-
site devoted to the Center for Professional Responsibility website has a table revealing whether
a state has adopted a particular section of the Code).
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(3) [the judge] has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser, or material witness con-
cerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) [the judge] knows that [the judge], individually or as a fiduciary, or
[the judge's] spouse or minor child residing in [the] household, has
a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) [the judge or the judge's] spouse, or a person within the third de-
gree to either of them, or the spouse of such person: [is a party, of-
ficer of a party, a lawyer, or is likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding, or has an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome]. 26
Subsection (a), in contrast, is open-ended, and therefore dramati-
cally broader, and addresses the appearance of partiality: "Any justice,
judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned. ' ' 27 In Liteky v. United States, 28 Justice Scalia traced the history of
section 455 and emphasized the difference in the two subsections.
Added in 1974, "subsection (a) ... was an entirely new 'catchall' recusal
provision" directed to "the objective appearance of partiality" and "goes
beyond (b)" to cover "all aspects of partiality, and not merely those
specifically addressed in subsection (b)."29 So as a practical matter, a
federal judge must evaluate whether he or she falls within the fact pat-
terns of subsection (b), which require disqualification, and if not, ask
for purposes of subsection (a) whether there is any other way in which
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.0
26 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2012).
27 Id. at 5 455(a).
28 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
29 Id. at 548, 553 n.2 (emphasis in original). Another federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012),
addresses situations in which a litigant believes that a judge has a personal bias or prejudice
against him or her or in favor of another party. It empowers the litigant to raise the issue by
filing an affidavit explaining the basis for his or her belief, upon which the judge acts no further
until another judge addresses the affidavit's allegations.
30 There is an additional, independent procedure in the federal system available when a liti-
gant believes that a judge is actually personally biased against him or her, or in favor of an op-
ponent. Under 28 U.S.C. 5 144 (2012), a litigant can file an affidavit stating the "facts and rea-
sons" behind such belief. Assuming the affidavit is filed timely and is ultimately deemed
[Vol. 13:441
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At the state level, disqualification provisions typically appear as
part of the state's judicial code of conduct, and track the disqualifica-
tion provision appearing in Rule 2.11 of the 2007 ABA Model Code or
its predecessor, Canon 3E of the 1990 Model Code (as amended in
1999 and 2003)."' In full, Rule 2.11 reads:
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, in-
cluding but not limited to the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party
or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in
dispute in the proceeding.
(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic
partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of either of
them is:
(a) a party [or a principal in a party] in the proceeding;
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that
could be substantially affected in the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or
the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or any other
member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household,
has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or
in a party to the proceeding.
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a
party, a party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has
within the previous [insert number] year[s] made aggregate con-
tributions to the judge's campaign in an amount that is greater
than
[Option 1:] [$[insert amount] for an individual or
$[insert amount] for an entity] or [Option 2:] [is
reasonable and appropriate for an individual or
entity].
"sufficient," another judge is assigned to hear the proceeding. In Litey, Justice Scalia explained
that this section was actually the first disqualification statute under federal law. See Iteky, 510
U.S. at 544.
31 JAMES J. ALFINI, STEPHEN LUBET, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & CHARLES GARDNER GEYH,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT & ETHICS 4.02, at 4-3-4-8 (4,h ed. 2007).
2015]
450 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICSJ.
(5) The judge, while a judge or judicial candidate, has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or
opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach
a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or
controversy.
(6) The judge:
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was as-
sociated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a
lawyer in the matter during such association;
(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity
participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or pub-
lic official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly ex-
pressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits
of the particular matter in controversy;
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter;
(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another
court.
32
As with the federal statute, a judge must disqualify himself or her-
self anytime "the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 33
The Model Rule, however, goes significantly further than the federal
statute by identifying up front two additional situations in which a
judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned": subsections (4)
and (5)-addressing campaign contributions and public statements, re-
spectively-have no counterpart in the federal statute.34 And indeed,
several states that have adopted the Model Code have foregone adopt-
ing those two subsections or have significantly modified them.35
The origin of those subsections is particularly worth noting. Sub-
section (4), addressing the concern that judges could be influenced into
32 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 2.11, at 25-26.
33 Id.
34 Compare MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 2.11 (A) with 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
35 See ABA CPR Policy Implementation Committee, Comparison ofABA Mode/Judidal Code
and State Variations on Rule 2.11, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-r
esponsibility/resources/judicial-ethics-regulation/aba-modelcode-comparison.html (last up-
dated Feb. 3, 2014). According to the ABA, as of Feb. 3, 2014, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota and Wy-
oming have not included subsection (A)(4), while Arizona, Caifornia, Iowa, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee and Utah have included some version of the subsection. Delaware, Hawaii
and South Dakota have also declined to include subsection (5).
[Vol. 13:441
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favoring contributors to their election campaigns, was added to the
Model Code in 1999.36 The change "responded to a public perception,
confirmed by polling data, that judges were influenced by the campaign
contributions they received."37  Subsection (5), aimed at discouraging
judges from sitting on cases their public statements suggest they have
prejudged, was added in 2003.38 It responded to the Supreme Court's
2002 decision in Republican Pary v. White,39 holding that a state could not
bar a judicial candidate from announcing positions that could come be-
fore him or her on the court without violating the First Amendment.
40
The idea was that if candidates could not be prevented from publicly
committing to positions, the litigants who would later come before
them ought at least be able to challenge their prejudgment of issues.41
B. Judidal Code of Conduct Provisions Aimed at Impartialiy
"Impartiality" as defined by the Model Code has two aspects. One
aspect sounds in terms of parier it is "the absence of bias or prejudice
in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties. 42 The
other sounds in terms of ideas: Impartiality means "the maintenance of
an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge."'4 3
The Code is replete with general references to the need for judges
to act impartially. The first, second, and fourth of the Code's four Can-
ons (which set forth the Code's governing principles)' refer expressly
to impartiality,4 and the third directs judges to conduct their "personal
36 See CONFERENCE REPORT: ABA Annual Meeting, 15 LAws MAN. PROF. CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) 396, 399 (1999).
37 ALFINI, LUBET, SHAMAN & GEYH, supra note 31, § 4.02, at 4-5.
38 Id. at 4-6.
39 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
40 See id. at 788.
41 See ALFINI, LUBET, SHAMAN & GEYH, supra note 31, § 4.02, at 4-6.
42 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Terminology, at 5.
43 Id.
44 Id., Scope, at 2. "The Canons state overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges
must observe. Although a judge may be disciplined only for violating a Rule, the Canons pro-
vide important guidance in interpreting the Rules." Id.
45 Canon I requires a judge to "uphold and promote the independence, integrity and impar-
tiality of the judiciary," and to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Id.,
Canon 1, at 15. Interestingly, the corresponding canon in the Code of Conduct for Federal
Judges does not include the reference to "impartiality." CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGFS Canon 1 ("A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judici-
ary.") [hereinafter FEDERALJUDICIAL CODE]. Canon 2 of the Model Code states that "[a] judge
shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently. MODEL
2015]
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and extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with the obli-
gations of judicial office," of which impartiality is obviously a huge
part.46 Rule 1.2 states that "A judge shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and im-
partiality of the judiciary. 47 Rules 2.2 and 2.3 require judges to "per-
form all duties" of their office "fairly and impartially," and "without bi-
as or prejudice. 48
The Code is not limited, however, to generalities. In service of
avoiding partiality to parties, Rule 2.4 directs that a judge not submit to
any "external influences": he or she is not to "be swayed by public
clamor or criticism," "permit family, social, political, financial, or other
interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or
judgment," or "convey the impression that any person or organization
is in a position to influence the judge., 49 In service of retaining the
open-mindedness necessary to impartiality, Rule 2.10 prohibits judges
from making public statements that could reasonably be expected to
affect the fairness of a proceeding, and from making "pledges, promise,
or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance"
of judging."0
It is also expected that judges will limit their extrajudicial activities.
The Code expressly allows activities concerned with "the law, legal sys-
tem, or the administration of justice," and those sponsored by non-
profit "educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organiza-
CODE, supra note 9, Canon 2, at 17; see FEDERAL JUDICAL CODE, supra, Canon 3. Canon 4 of
the Model Code reads: "A judge or candidate for judicial office shall not engage in political or
campaign activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity or impartiality of the ju-
diciary." MODEl. CODE, supra note 9, Canon 4, at 49; see FEDERALJUDICIAl. CODE, supra, Can-
ons 4 ("a judge should not participate in extrajudicial activities that.., reflect adversely on the
judge's impartiality"), 5 ("A judge shall refrain from political activity').
46 MODEl. CODE, supra note 9, Canon 3, at 33; see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45,
Canon 4 ("A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities that are consistent with the obligations
of judicial office.").
47 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 1.2, at 15; see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45,
Canon 2A.
48 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 2.2, 2.3(A), at 17-18; see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra
note 45, Canon 3 ("A judge should perform the duties of the office fairly, impartially, and dii-
gently").
49 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 2.4, at 19; see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45,
Canon 2B.
50 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 2.10(A), (B), at 24-25; see FEDERAILJUDICIAL CODE, supra
note 45, Canon 3A(6) ("A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter
pending or impending in any court.").
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tions" are expressly allowed,"1 but Rule 3.1 prohibits a judge from par-
ticipating in any activities that "would appear to a reasonable person to
undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality." 2 These
prohibited activities can include attending events where a judge's travel,
food or lodging is provided or reimbursed, or fees or other charges are
waived, no matter what type of organization, if a reasonable person
would believe the reimbursement or waiver would undermine the
judge's impartiality.53
51 MODEL CODE, spra note 9, R. 3.7(A), at 38-39; see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note
45, Canon 4A(3).
52 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 3.1 (C), at 33; see FEDERAl. JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45,
Canon 4 ("a judge should not participate in extrajudicial activities that ... reflect adversely on
the judge's impartiality"). The language of the cited Rule was changed between the 1990 Code
and the 2007 Code. "The Commission believed that the standard used in the 1990 Code, which
prohibited activities or conduct that 'cast reasonable doubt' on a judge's impartiality, was too
closely associated with the criminal law, and did not accurately express the appropriate thresh-
old for prohibiting any particular activity." CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODE,
REPORTERS' NOTES TO THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 3.1, at 57 (2009) (herein-
after "REPORTERS' NOTES").
53 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 3.14(A), at 46 (allowing expense coverage "unless other-
wise prohibited by Rulel] 3.1," which includes activities that a reasonable person would find
undermine impartiality); see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45, Canon 4H ("A judge may
accept compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the law-related and extrajudicial activ-
ities permitted by this Code if the source of the payments does not give the appearance of in-
fluencing the judge in the judge's judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of improprie-
ty."). To apply that standard in evaluating their extrajudicial activities, judges are directed to
consider a number of factors:
(a) whether the sponsor is an accredited educational institution or bar associa-
tion rather than a trade association or a for-profit entity;
(b) whether the funding comes largely from numerous contributors rather
than from a single entity and is earmarked for programs with specific con-
tent;
(c) whether the content is related or unrelated to the subject matter of litiga-
tion pending or impending before the judge, or to matters that are likely to
come before the judge;
(d) whether the activity is primarily educational rather than recreational, and
whether the costs of the event are reasonable and comparable to those as-
sociated with similar events sponsored by the judiciary, bar associations, or
similar groups;
(e) whether information concerning the activity and its funding sources is
available upon inquiry;
(f) whether the sponsor or source of funding is generally associated with par-
ticular parties or interests currently appearing or likely to appear in the
judge's court, thus possibly requiring disqualification of the judge under
Rule 2.11;
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Finally, by the specific terms of Rule 4.1, a judge may not engage
in a number of activities associated with "political organizations. ' 4 As a
judge, or as a candidate for judge, a person cannot contribute to or so-
licit funds for a political organization; act as a leader in, hold office in
or make speeches for a political organization; or, except within a win-
dow of time immediately preceding an election, even publicly identify
himself or herself as a candidate of, or endorsed by, a political organiza-
tion.5 Nor may a judge or candidate "personally solicit" campaign
funds: contributions may be solicited and accepted only through a
campaign committee organized for the purpose. 6
Under the Model Code as adopted by most of the states, anything
denominated a "Rule" is enforceable against a judge. 7 Each state has a
judicial conduct commission, and those entities address violations of
the Code brought to their attention by the public or otherwise. 8 This
does not mean that every violation results in discipline. The Model
(g) whether differing viewpoints are presented; and
(h) whether a broad range of judicial and nonjudicial participants are invited,
whether a large number of participants are invited, and whether the pro-
gram is designed specifically for judges.
MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R.3.14, comment 3, at 47.
54 A "political organization" is defined as "a political party or other group sponsored by or
affiliated with a political party or candidate, the principal purpose of which is to further the
election or appointment of candidates for political office." MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Termi-
nology, at 7; see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45, Canon 5 Commentary ('political or-
ganization' refers to a political party, a group affiliated with a political party or candidate for
public office, or an entity whose principal purpose is to advocate for or against political candi-
dates or parties in connection with elections for public office").
55 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 4.1 (A)(1), (2), (4), (6), (7) at 49-50; id., R. 4.2(C), at 54; see
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45, Canon 5A (judge should not be leader of, hold office
in, make speeches for, solicit funds for, contribute to, or attend or purchase a ticket for a dinner
or other event sponsored by a political organization or candidate), 5C ("A judge should not en-
gage in any other political activity.").
56 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 4.1(A)(8), at 49; see FEDERALJUDICIAL CODE, supra note
45, Canon 5A. The Code Rules collected here are important to exploring the "likelihood" of
judicial bias as addressed by the Caperton case, but they are by no means the only Rules further-
ing an interest in judicial impartiality. The Code also includes Rules that are more pointed, in
that they address actual bias and discrimination and financial interests. See, e.g., MODEL CODE,
supra note 9, R. 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment), 3.6 (Affiliation with Discriminatory Or-
ganizations), 3.8 (Appointments to Fiduciary Positions), and 3.11 (Financial, Business or Re-
munerative Activities).
57 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Scope, at 2.
58 ALFINI, LUBET, SI-LMAN & GEYH, spra note 31, §§ 1.04,13.02, at 1-10, 13-2 to 13-3 (cit-
ing I. TESTITOR & D. SINKS,JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 19-27 (2d ed. 1980)).
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Code itself describes the Rules as "rules of reason," and directs that
disciplinary action depend on the seriousness of the transgression, the
facts and circumstances as they existed at the time, the extent of any
pattern of impropriety, the existence of previous violations, and the ef-
fect of the violations on others.5 9 With that said, in most states, the dis-
ciplinary measures available range from admonishment all the way up
to removal from office.60
Enforcement of judicial code provisions is a somewhat different
matter at the federal level. Importantly, when the Judicial Conference
otherwise adopted the 1990 ABA Model Code, it chose not to adopt
the mandatory language recommended. 61 Thus, while the United States
Code of Conduct for Federal Judges is substantively very similar to the
1990 ABA Code in the conduct it addresses, it uses the term "should"
in most sections, rather than the mandatory "shall., 62 This in turn
leaves a federal judge's decisions about his or her conduct within his or
her discretion, 63 and obviously detracts from the Code's ready enforce-
ability.
Complaints for Code violations, as well as any other conduct
"prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the busi-
ness of the courts ' 64 are heard by Federal Judicial Councils 65 associated
with each of the thirteen circuits. 66 As with the state judicial conduct
commissions, these councils are authorized to impose discipline for
misconduct.67 Unlike the state commissions, however, they cannot
themselves remove a judge from office, because the Constitution re-
serves the impeachment and removal power to Congress.68
59 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Scope, at 2.
60 Ai-FINI, LUBET, SHAMAN & GEYHI, supra note 31, §1.04, at 1 -10 (citing 1. TESTITOR & D.
SINKSJUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 19-27 (2d ed. 1980)).
61 Lievense & Cohn, supra note 24, at 278.
62 The only Canon employing mandatory language in the entire federal judicial code is the
one addressing disqualification. Compare FEDERAL JUDICIAL. CODE, supra note 45, Canon 3C
with id., Canons 1, 2, 3A, 3B, 3D, 4, 5.
63 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, Scope, at 2 ("Where a Rule contains a permissive term, such
as 'may' or 'should,' the conduct addressed is committed to the personal and professional dis-
cretion of the judge or candidate in question, and no disciplinary action should be taken for
action or inaction within the bounds of such discretion.").
64 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2012).
65 The Federal Judicial Councils consist of the chief circuit judge and an equal number of
circuit judges and district judges. Id. § 332 (2012).
66 See id. § 351(a) (2012).
67 See id. § 354(a)(2) (2012).
68 See U.S. CONST., art. I, 5 2, cl. 5, § 3, cl. 6; id. art. III, 5 1; 28 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (2012)
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At first blush, limitations on a judge's conduct such as those pre-
sented here may seem onerous. But they are grounded expressly in the
long-held beliefs that judges must always aspire to impartiality and that
extensive activity in the political arena will render that impartiality much
harder to attain. The Commentary to the Model Code section address-
ing judicial political conduct makes this very clear:
Even when subject to public election, a judge plays a role different
from that of a legislator or executive branch official. Rather than
making decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of
the electorate, a judge makes decisions based upon the law and the
facts of every case. Therefore, in furtherance of this interest, judges
and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free
and appear to be free from political influence and political pres-
69sure.
Perhaps just as importantly, judges choose to become judges, and
they do so knowing that any conduct appearing to compromise their
independence or impartiality will undermine public confidence in the
judiciary."' Indeed, the Code makes clear within the very first Canon
that they will be held to a restraint not asked of the public: "A judge
should expect to be the subject of public scrutiny that might be viewed
as burdensome if applied to other citizens, and must accept the re-
strictions of the Code.'
C. The "5"peial" Supreme Court(s)
As the preceding sections describe, federal and state judges are
bound by disqualification provisions and judicial codes of conduct in
their respective jurisdictions. There are, however, some very important
caveats with respect to the nation's "top" courts.
First, the Supreme Court of the United States is technically bound
by no code of judicial conduct whatsoever. The Code of Conduct for
(providing for Judicial Conference to recommend impeachment to the House of Representa-
tives if it concurs with recommendation ofJudicial Council).
69 MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 4.1, comment 1, at 50.
70 See MODEL CODE, supra note 9, R. 1.2, comment 3, at 15.
71 MODEl. CODE, supra note 9, R. 1.2, comment 2, at 15; see also Hayes v. Alabama Court of
Judiciary, 437 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Ala. 1983); In re Troy, 300 N.E.2d 159, 191 (Mass. 1973); In
re Piper, 534 P.2d 159, 164 (Or. 1975); see generaly STEVEN LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH:
ETHICAl. RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES
(1984).
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United States Judges, by its terms, applies only to the courts beneath
the Supreme Court.72 Thus, according to Chief Justice Roberts, the
members of the Supreme treat the Code as a "current and uniform
source of guidance," but are not bound by it.73
Second, in considering whether to disqualify themselves from cas-
es, the Supreme Court justices apparently go beyond the language of
the disqualification law to consider the effect their disqualification will
have on the hearing of any given case. Chief Justice Roberts has stated
that the members of the Supreme Court do consider themselves gov-
erned by section 455, the federal disqualification statute, which requires
recusal whenever their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.4
But when making that decision, the Chief Justice has said, the justices
must also consider that no one can substitute for them, and so "if a Jus-
tice withdraws from a case, the Court must sit without its full member-
ship.",71 It is unclear from the Chief Justice's statement exactly what im-
pact that recognition is supposed to have, but it does seem that the
Chief Justice envisions section 455 applying differently at the Supreme
Court level in some respect.
Finally, at the Supreme Court level, each judge herself or himself is
the sole arbiter of disqualification questions.76 No procedure exists for
transferring a disqualification question to another Justice or seeking
concurrence from the remainder of the Court.77 In the Chief Justice's
view, peer review "would create an undesirable situation in which the
Court could affect the outcome of a case by selecting who among its
Members may participate.
78
Many of the state supreme courts do likewise, allowing only the
72 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 45, Introduction.
73 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at 5 (Dec. 31, 2011) (Roberts, C.J.), avail-
able at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/201 lyear-endreport.pdf.
74 Id. at 7 (They do this the Chief Justice said, even though "the limits of Congress's power
to require recusal have never been tested." The Chief Justice's remark raises the interesting
question of whether the Court considers it a separation of powers issue for Congress to issue
rules of disqualification).
75 Id. at 9.
76 Id. at 8 ("the individual Justices decide for themselves whether recusal is warranted under
section 455').
77 Id. at 8-9 ("There is no higher court to review a Justice's decision not to recuse in a par-
ticular case," and "the Supreme Court does not sit in judgment of one of its own Members'
decision whether to recuse in the course of deciding a case").
78 Id. at 9.
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challenged justice to make the disqualification decision." Those who do
so have defended it by expressly invoking the United States Supreme
Court's practice." A justice on the Wisconsin high court has also sug-
gested that broadening the disqualification decision beyond a chal-
lenged justice would have its own negative impact on the public's per-
ception: "the specter of four justices preventing another justice from
participating will just as likely be seen by the public as a biased act of
four justices who view a pending issue differently from the justice
whom they disqualified."'" Other courts have disagreed, and subject
their justices' disqualification decisions to review by the other court
members.82
79 See Stilley v. James, 53 S.W.3d 524, 525 (Ark. 2001) ("each justice individually declines to
disqualify'); In re Estate of Carlton, 378 So. 2d 1212, 1216-17 (Fla. 1979) (each justice must
determine for himself both the legal sufficiency of a request seeking his disqualification and the
propriety of withdrawing in any particular circumstances); People v. Wilson, 497 N.E.2d 302,
303-04 (I. 1986) (Simon, J.) (rejecting suggestion that full court could recuse); Peterson v.
Borst, 784 N.E.2d 934, 937 (Ind. 2003) (Boehm, J.) (individually denying recusal motion); Dean
v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Ky. 2006) (Roach, J.) (individually granting recusal motion;
"the decision to recuse should not be made lightly by a Kentucky Supreme Court Justice"); In
re modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, 438 N.W.2d 95
(Minn. 1989) ("[Wle have declined to rule on this motion and instead we refer the matter to
Chief Justice Popovich individually for decision."); In re Waltemade, 1974 N.Y. LEXIS 1851
(N.Y. Ct. on the Judiciary 1974) ("the practice of the Court is for the individual Judge to decide
the question'); Noriega Rodriguez v. Hernandez Colon, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 285, 296 (P.R.
1988) (adopting individual decisions by justices); Cohen v. Manchin, 336 S.E.2d 171, 175-76
(W. Va. 1984) ("Where a motion is made to disqualify or recuse an individual justice of this
Court, that question is to be decided by the challenged justice and not by the other members of
this Court.").
80 See State v. Henley, 802 N.W. 2d 175, 181 (Wis. 2011) ("the court's 1OP mirrors the way
in which the United States Supreme Court addresses motions to disqualify a Supreme Court
Justice'); see also Pellegrino v. Ampco Systems Parking, 807 N.W.2d 40, 40 n.2 (Mich. 2009)
("this Court's longstanding practice of jindividual] judicial recusal is nearly identical to that of
the United States Supreme Court") (Young, J.) (citing Supreme Court of the United States,
Statement of Recusal Policy, Nov. 1, 1993 signed by Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., available at http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20110106_Rec
usalPolicy23.pdf).
81 Id. at 184.
82 See Mosk v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 601 P.2d 1030, 1034 & n.2 (Cal.
1979) (court disqualified justice from participation after others had recused); State ex rel.
Mitchell v. Sage Stores, 143 P.2d 652, 658-59 (Kan. 1943) (court denied motion to recuse and
challenged justice did not participate); State ex rel. Hall v. Niewoehner, 155 P.2d 205, 209-210
(Mont. 1944) (court reviewed and denied motion to recuse four of five justices); State ex rel.
Short v. Martin, 256 P. 681, 685 (Okla. 1927) (extensive discussion of review by court);
Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757, 764 (Pa. 1989) ("Where disqualification is raised before the
Court and the merit of the motion obvious, the remaining Justices have the duty to request that
Justice to accede to the recusal request"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 1.225(4) (2009) ("Hearing on
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II. POLITICIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
OBSTACLES To REFORM
There is no small irony in reviewing the codes of judicial conduct
in effect across the country. Reading them in a vacuum would leave a
reader convinced of the distance between life on the bench and life in
the political arena. The codes present an image of judges who are in-
volved in their communities but appreciate that they can perform their
jobs best if they avoid the political rough and tumble and keep their
public statements on controversy to a minimum.
A. The Prevalence ofJudicial Elections and the Millions Flowing Into Them
Unfortunately, that commitment to circumspection-to a detach-
ment from politics-is becoming increasingly difficult for judges to
maintain. Federal judges continue to be appointed and confirmed in ac-
cordance with the Constitution, but at the state level, judicial election
has become the norm.83 In the vast majority of states, trial judges are
popularly elected,84 and in almost half of the states, the members of the
such charge shall be had before the other justices of the Supreme Court."); TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3
("challenged justice or judge must either [recuse] .. .or certify the matter to the entire court,
which will decide the motion by a majority of the remaining judges sitting en bane"); VT. R.
App. P. 31 (e)(2) (requiring justice whose recusal is sought to refer motion to other justices).
83 The country has gone back and forth in the prevalence of judicial elections. The first
twenty-nine states to join the Union employed selection methods that did not involve popular
election. See Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX. L. RFv. 1081,
1082 (1966) (citing EVAN HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OFJUDGES 101-35 (1944)). During
the Jacksonian movement toward popular democracy, this uniformity changed. The first elect-
ed judges were lower court judges in Georgia, then Mississippi adopted a completely elected
judiciary, and the other states followed, until by the Civil War, 22 of the 34 states elected their
judges.; Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures and Issues, 49 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 1, 5 (1994). In the early twentieth century, however, the states began to shift to a hybrid
model, widely known as the Missouri Plan, under which judges are initially appointed but then
subject to unopposed retention elections. See Winters, supra, at 1084; see also Roscoe Pound, The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 23 (1956) (re-
printing Roscoe Pound's 1906 speech asserting that "compelling judges to become politicians,
in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench").
84 Trial judges must be popularly elected to the bench in 33 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Ari-
zona (only some districts), California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas (only
some districts), Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland (only some districts), Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri (only some districts), Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Car-
olina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Tex-
as, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See American Judicature Society, Methods of
Judicial Selection, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/selection-of .jud
ges.cfm?state (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (American Judicature Society compilation of methods,
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highest courts are popularly elected. s In several more states, even when
a judge is appointed through a merit selection process, the judge will at
some point thereafter be subject to a retention election.16 All told, only
twelve state jurisdictions eschew popular election altogether for their
judges.87
Whether popular election in and of itself has a negative effect on
judicial impartiality has been the subject of debate.88 But there is little
question that the current big-money campaigns are having a detrimental
effect. Money has begun to flow so dramatically into judicial elections
that justices feel increasingly that they have no choice but to seek major
benefactors, and with benefactors come expectations.89 According to a
state by state). In twelve of these states-Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mis-
souri, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia-the elec-
tions that are held are partisan, political party affairs.
85 Members of the state's highest court must be popularly elected in 22 states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. In seven of these states-Alabama,
Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia, the elections are
openly partisan. See id.
86 In six states-Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming-judges are never el-
ected to the bench as an initial matter, but are nonetheless subject to retention elections. See id.
87 Interestingly, the group of twelve states that do not engage in judicial elections at all in-
cludes eight of the original thirteen states: Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Virginia. See id.
88 Compare CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 128-38 (2009); Julius Uehlein & David H. Wilderman, Opinion: Why Merit Selection Is
Inconsistent with Democrag, 106 DICK. L. REV. 769, 770-71 (2002); Michael Debow, et al., The
Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, 33 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 393, 396 (2002); with Charles Gard-
ner Geyh, Why Judidal Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 58-61 (2002); Meryl J. Chertoff,
Trends in judicialElections in the States, 42 McGEORGE L. REV. 51, 52 (2010). At one time, judges
were elected, but many ran unopposed. In 1984, 33% of nonpartisan elections, and 75% of
partisan elections were contested. Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral
Competition in State Supreme Court Elections, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 21 (2004); Chris W. Bonneau &
Melinda Gann Hall, Predicting Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections: Context and the Politics of
Institutional Design, 56 POL. RES. Q. 337 (2003). By 2000, 75% of nonpartisan elections, and
95% of partisan elections, were contested. Id.
89 An Ohio Supreme Court justice described the pressure this way: "I never felt so much
like a hooker down by the bus station in any race I've ever been in as I did in a judicial race.
Everyone interested in contributing has very specific interests. They mean to be buying a
vote." Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2006 (quoting Justice Paul E. Pfeifer), available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all. A retired chief justice of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals concurred. "It's pretty hard in big-money races not to take care of
your friends. Its very hard not to dance with one who brung you." Id. (quoting former Chief
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widely cited study of campaign funding, judicial candidates raised 2.5
times as much money in the 2000-2009 decade as they did from 1990-
1999 (compared to a consumer price index rise of only 250/o),90 And
there seems to be no end to it. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, for ex-
ample, spending on television ads shattered all previous records, the
$33.7 million spent marking a 18% increase (in inflation-adjusted dol-
lars) over the previous recordsetting year of 2007-2008.91
The influx of money into judicial campaigns did not just evolve
organically: it is the product of the war over "tort reform." It appears to
have begun with Karl Rove's organized efforts in the 1980's and 1990's
to alter the composition of the Texas courts 92 and picked up nation-
wide momentum in 2000, when the United States Chamber of Com-
merce chose to become involved.93 At that time, the Chamber an-
nounced that it would be "raising millions of dollars to support pro-
business candidates in tight races where the Chamber's help will make a
difference."94 The Chamber cited reports by the American Tort Reform
Foundation that plaintiffs' lawyers associations had contributed $18
million to judicial candidates over the previous three years. 9'
In the fourteen years since, the Chamber has more than followed
through on its 2000 promise. The Chamber has amassed a formidable
group of active business allies. The National Association of Manufac-
turers has created a funding group called the American Justice Partner-
Justice Richard Neely).
90 James Sample, Adam Skaggs, Jonathan Blitzer & Linda Casey, The New Poliics of Judidal
Ekeions, 2000-2009: Decade of Change, at 8 (August 2010), available at http://www.jusiceatstake.o
rg/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83e3.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
91 The New Poliics of Judicial Elections 2011-2012, at 1 (2013) (in inflation-adjusted dollars,
$28.2 million was spent on television ads in 2007-2008), available at http://newpolitics
report.org/report/2012-report/introduction/ (hereinafter "New Politics Report').
92 See Joshua Green, Karl Rove in a Corner, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 2004, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/20041 1/green.
93 See Robert Lenzner & Matthew Miller, Buying Justice, FoRBEs, July 21, 2003, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0721/064.html; William Glaberson, U.S. Chamber Will
Promote Business Views in Court Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000; Jim VandeHei, Political Cover:
Major Business Lobby Wins Back Its Clout by Dispensing Favors, WALL, ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001; Battle
Over the Courts, Bus. WK, Sept. 27, 2004.
94 Press Release, United States Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, Chamber
Calls Trial Lanyer Political Contributions a Wake-Up Call for Business (Jan. 23, 2000), available at
http: //www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/chamber-calls-trial-lawyer-political-
contributions-a-wake-up-call-for-business.
95 See id. (quoting Chamber President Jim Wootten) ("'The trial lawyers clearly want to in-
fluence the 2000 elections and the appointment of judges; block legal reform; and use govern-
ment lawsuits to target unpopular industries.").
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ship and began making regular contributions to judicial races.96 The
large tobacco corporations fund state elections through the American
Tort Reform Association and the Center for Individual Freedom.9"
Multiple large corporations-including Home Depot, AIG, Walmart,
Daimler/Chrysler, and the American Council of Life Insurers-have
contributed.98 By the end of the decade, business groups had outspent
union and trial lawyers' groups in state judicial elections by a rate of
more than 2:1.99
This is not to say that unions and plaintiffs' lawyers have not re-
sponded in kind. They have. As the last decade wore on, unions and
plaintiffs' lawyers' organizations escalated their fundraising efforts as
well, and pumped millions of dollars into judicial races, to the point
that by the blockbuster 2007-2008 election cycle, both sides were equal-
ly inundating the campaigns with funds,' 0 much of which was spent on
negative advertising.'
In the end, the fact that millions are now regularly invested in judi-
cial races has had several effects. Most immediately, it means that any
candidate seeking election to a judgeship virtually has to ally with a ma-
jor political organization, either one of the parties or a political action
committee. 10 2 Whether the candidate is well respected locally, or able to
raise money from a wide roster of individuals, does not in the end mat-
ter that much, because her campaign is likely to be dominated by five
political organizations spending literally 500 times as much as each of
her individual donors.
0 3
Further, because that funding alliance has become necessary to be
elected, the judge is likely to feel indebted to the interests that in effect
bought her or his seat. Indeed, even assuming that the newly elected
96 Sample et al., supra note 90, at 41.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 41 (citing Lenzner & Miler, supra note 93).
99 Id. at 40.
100 Id. ("plaintiffs' lawyers/unions/liberals" contributed $6.175 million to judicial races while
"business/conservatives" contributed $6.174 million).
101 See id. at 28-29.
102 See Sample et al., supra note 90, at 42-48,50-51 (identifying the key funding organizations
of the left and right in judicial elections). Conservative and business interests tend to funnel
their contributions through a national network of political action committees, while liberal in-
terests tend to fund campaigns through state organizations and party contributions. See id. at 42-
48.
103 See id. at 1 ("The top five spenders in each of [29 studied] elections invested an average of
$473,000, while the remaining 116,000 contributors averaged $850 each.").
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have been and continue to be capable of resisting favoritism, the public
is not willing to assume that that is so. Polls uniformly show that the
public believes that judges are influenced in their decisions by where
their campaign money has come from."4
B. The Increasing Insistence on Ideological Purio: Republican Pary v. White
and the Questionnaire Phenomenon
When political groups pour money into judicial campaigns, they
are consciously advocating resort to certain political views and policy
choices in the application of the law. At a minimum, they are seeking to
place a certain ype of judge on the bench, one who will lean one way or
the other politically whenever there are opportunities to do so. They
may want a business-oriented judge, for example, or one who will be
tough on crime. Perhaps this sort of politicization of the bench is inevi-
table as long as there are judicial elections, but the influx of big money
seriously exacerbates it. It becomes that much more difficult for judges
not to think about their contributors' reactions to decisions because
those contributors will be life-or-death when the next election comes
around.
This politicization of the bench would be worrisome enough, but
at least some of the political groups seeking control of the judiciary
have not been content with such general control over the bench. They
have gone beyond seeking certain general leanings in judicial candidates
to seeking an ideological purity with respect to certain issues."'5 As part
of this effort, they have embarked on a far-reaching campaign to strike
down the judicial code of conduct provisions limiting the political activ-
104 Justice at Stake/Brennan Center National Poll, conducted Oct. 22-24, 2013, at 3, available
at http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/news/topnes337_B2D51323DC5DO.pdf (87
percent of respondents felt that direct contributions to a judicial campaign or indirect contribu-
tions in the form of paid advertising would have either a great deal or some influence on judges'
decisions). See also id. at 4 (in the cited poll, 90 percent of the respondents felt that a campaign
contributor appearing before a judge would present a very or somewhat serious problem and 92
percent responded that the judge should step aside); Harris Interactive Financial Limit Survey,
conducted Feb. 12-15, 2009, available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/Justiceat-S
take_.CampaignFinal Tab BE1C0586C9129.pdf (68 percent of people polled would doubt
impartiality of judge if one party had donated $50,000 to the judge's campaign); History of Re-
form Efforts: Opinion Polls and Surveys, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialse
lection/reform-efforts/opinion polls.surveys.cfm?state (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (reporting
on state polls).
105 See Terry Carter, Loaded Questionnaires?: Judiial Candidates Advised To Be Wa y of Answers
Inviting Suits Challenging Canons, 5 No. 36 ABA J. E-REPORT 3 (Sept. 8, 2006).
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ities of judicial candidates. 116 Their success in this endeavor began with
the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Partj v. White.' v
In White, the Court held that Minnesota's "announce" clause vio-
lated the first amendment.0 8 The clause, based on Canon 7(B) of the
1972 Model Code, stated that a judicial candidate or judge was not to
"announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. ' ' As a
restriction on speech, the clause was subject to strict scrutiny, and the
majority, speaking through Justice Scalia, held that the clause was not
narrowly tailored to the state's interests in preserving judicial impartiali-
ty and the public's perception of that impartiality. The majority would
not accept the proposition that a judge could face untoward and unac-
ceptable pressure in decisionmaking to the extent a politicized judicial
campaign forced him or her to announce stances on issues that were
likely to end up before the judge on the bench."0 And Justice Scalia all
but ridiculed the idea that a judicial candidate might be expected to
adopt different conduct-depoliticized conduct in honor of the pro-
fession he or she was seeking to join."1
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented, and Jus-
tices Stevens and Ginsburg each filed opinions joined by all the oth-
ers. 1 2 Justice Stevens minced no words in decrying the majority's failure
to distinguish judicial and political candidacies. He wrote that "every
good judge is fully aware of the distinction between the law and a per-
sonal point of view," and so a judicial candidate had no business en-
couraging people to vote for him or her on the basis of that "personal
point of view.""' 3 "Indeed," Stevens wrote, "to the extent that such
statements seek to enhance the popularity of a candidate by indicating
how he would rule in specific cases if elected, they evidence a lack offit-
106 See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
107 536 U.S. 769 (2002).
108 See id. at 788.
109 Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. STAT., Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
110 See id. at 781 ("M1]t suffices to say that respondents have not carried the burden imposed
by our strict-scrutiny test to establish this proposition (that campaign statements are uniquely
destructive of open-mindedness) on which the validity of the announce clause rests...'".
I1l See id. at 779-80. Justice Scalia wrote: "[A judicial candidate may say the very same thing,
however, up until the very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly
(until litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing the objective of open-
mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive
as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous."). Id.
112 See 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); See also id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ness for the offce." 114
Justice Ginsburg elaborated on the distinction between the judicial
and political roles. In her opening paragraph, she quoted Justice Scalia
himself for the proposition that judges are actually supposed to 'stand
up to what is generally supreme in a democracy: the popular will.'
115
Because of this, she wrote, the Court's "unrelenting reliance on deci-
sions involving contests for legislative and executive posts is manifestly
out of place,"" 6 and the Court should allow states to limit judicial cam-
paign speech "by measures impermissible in elections for political of-
fice."' " Justice Ginsburg also challenged Justice Scalia for belittling the
distinction between statements made before a judicial candidacy and
those made after. She noted that he had drawn precisely such a distinc-
tion when he appeared before the Senate in connection with his con-
firmation."8 She also quoted then-Justice Rehnquist acknowledging
why judicial nominees should refrain from political statements:
[one must] distinguish quite sharply between a public statement
made prior to nomination for the bench, on the one hand, and a
public statement made by a nominee to the bench. For the latter to
express any but the most general observation about the law would
suggest that, in order to obtain favorable consideration of his nomi-
nation, he deliberately was announcing in advance, without benefit
of judicial oath, briefs, or argument, how he would decide a particu-
lar question that might come before him as a judge.'' 9
Though they did not carry the day, the White dissents were certain-
ly correct that the decision "obscure[ed] the fundamental distinction
between campaigns for the judiciary and the political branches."' 20 Al-
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Laaw of
Rules, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989)).
116 See 536 U.S. at 806.
117 Id. at 807.
118 Id. at 818 n.4. (Then-Judge Scalia said, "Let us assume that I have people arguing before
me to do it or not to do it. I think it is quite a thing to be arguing to somebody who you know
has made a representation in the course of his confirmation hearings, and that is, by way of
condition to his being confirmed, that he will do this or do that. I think I would be in a very
bad position to adjudicate the case without being accused of having a less than impartial view
of the matter." (quoting 13 R. MERSKY &J. JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF
SUPREME COURTJUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM1T'TEE, 1916-1986 (1989)).
119 Id. at 819 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 n.5 (1972)).
120 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); See id. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (the majority
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most immediately, special interest groups began seeking to pack the ju-
diciary with judges sympathetic to their political views. Conservative,
anti-abortion groups in particular began distributing questionnaires to
judicial candidates asking them to announce their views on abortion
and other issues, such as homosexuality, public school graduation pray-
er, parental choice in education and assisted suicide. 121 At least one even
included the following question: "Which of the following former U.S.
Presidents best represents your political philosophy?," and provided the
following as an answer choice: "John F. Kennedy/Jimmy
Carter/Ronald Reagan/George Bush (former) /Undecided/Decline to
answer."'
122
Typically, the questionnaires would cite the White decision and in-
sist that the group was seeking only the candidate's views, not any
pledge, promise or commitment (because the White court had allowed
for states to prohibit pledges). 23 If a candidate answered the "wrong"
way, the candidate would be denied the group's support.124 If the can-
didate "refused" to respond, the candidate's views would be contrasted
with cooperating candidates who had answered in accordance with the
group's views. 2  And if a candidate "declined" to respond on the
ground that judicial ethics rules prohibited such announcements, the
group often would sue the state judicial body to invalidate its code.126
Indeed, White set in motion not just the use of judicial question-
fails to acknowledge the .'fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office
and the real world of electoral politics"').
121 See Steven Pollak, Declare Stands on Social Issues, Coalition Asks Court Hopefuls, THE DAILY
REPORT, May 14, 2004 at 1; Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d
840, 844 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In October 2002, the Alaska Right to Life Political Action Commit-
tee ... circulated a questionnaire to the twelve Alaska state court judges who were seeking re-
tention votes .. .solicit[ing] the judges' views on a variety of legal and political issues such as
abortion and assisted suicide."); Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 547 (7th
Cir. 2007) ("Indiana Right to Life sent questionnaires to judicial candidates in 2002 [that] cov-
ered topics such as abortion and physician-assisted suicide.").
122 Pennsylvania Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2007).
123 Penny J. White, A New Perspective on Judidal Disqualfcation: An Antidote to the Effects of the
Decisions, in White and Citizens United, 46 IND. L. REv. 103, 107 & n.18 (2013).
124 Id
125 Id. at 107-08.
126 Id. (citing Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002)); Kansas Judicial Watch v.
Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1218-19 (D. Kan. 2006), vacated and question certified, 519 F.3d 1107
(10th Cir. 2008); Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879 (N.D. Ind. 2006),
rev'd, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Family Trust Found. of Kentucky v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp.
2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
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naires, but a series of lawsuits aimed at dismantling virtually every ethi-
cal limitation on candidates designed to further judicial impartiality and
depoliticize campaigns. In the last ten years, special interest groups
have brought lawsuits challenging the codes' announcement, 2 v pledges
.. 129 -. 130
or promises, 128  non-solicitation, non-endorsement and non-
affiliation 3' clauses in more than half the federal circuits 1 2 These rul-
127 The "announcement" clause struck down in White, see supra note 111 and accompanying
text, appeared in the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. It was deleted from the 2007
Model Code in response to the Supreme Court's decision in White. See also REPORTERS'
NOTES, supra note 52, at 100.
128 MODEL CODE of judicial Conduct R. 4.1(A)(13) (what is commonly known as the
"pledges or promises" clause in the 2007 Model Code states that "[A] judge or a judicial candi-
date shall not ... in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come be-
fore the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial
performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office"). (R12.9.6 (citation of ABA Model
Code).
129 MODEL CODE of judicial Conduct R. 4.1(A)(8) (the "non-solicitation" clause in the 2007
Model Code states that "[a] judge or a judicial candidate shall not ... personally solicit or accept
campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee authorized by Rule 4.4.").
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the October 2014 Term to hear The Florida Bar v.
Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379 (Fla.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). Williams-Yulee wrote a
letter personally soliciting campaign funds, and was sanctioned by the Bar for violating Florida's
Canon 7C(1), which prohibits personal solicitation. Id. at 382. The Florida Supreme Court re-
jected Williams-Yulee's claim that 7C(1) violated the First Amendment. Id. at 387. The case
was argued before the Supreme Court on January 20, 2015, and as this article goes to press, a
decision is expected anytime.
130 MODEL CODE of Judicial Conduct R. 4.1(A)(3), R. 4.2(B). (the "non-endorsement"
clause in the 2007 Model Code states that "[a] judge or a judicial candidate shall not.., public-
ly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office," although he may endorse candidates for the
same office within a window of time prior to the election, as described in Rule 4.2(B)).
131 MODEL CODE of Judicial Conduct R. 4.1(A)(6), 4.2(C) (the "non-affiliation" clause in the
2007 Model Code states that "[a] judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . publicly identify
himself or herself as a candidate of a political organization," except within a window of time
prior to the election, as described in Rule 4.2(C)).
132 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2007) (po-
litical organization challenged Pennsylvania's pledges or promises clause and disqualification
rule requiring recusal if impartiality can reasonably be questioned and was dismissed for lack of
standing); Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 210 (6th Cir. 2010) (candidate successfully chal-
lenged Kentucky's non-affiliation and non-solicitation clauses, and pledges or promises clause
sent to lower court for further evaluation); Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2010)
(political organization and candidate unsuccessfully challenged Indiana's pledges or promises
and non-solicitation clauses and clauses prohibiting political activity for others); Siefert v. Alex-
ander, 608 F.3d 974, 990 (7th Cir. 2010) (candidate challenged Wisconsin's non-affiliation
clause, which court struck, and non-solicitation and non-endorsement clauses, which court up-
held), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028-30 (8th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (candidate had successfully challenged Minnesota's announcement clause in
White, and court on remand upheld non-endorsement clause and clause prohibiting solicitation
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ings have not all gone against the states' judicial codes.'3 3 The lawsuits
themselves, however, have presented a threat sufficient that many states
have chosen to repeal the provisions rather than stand and fight.
134
In the midst of all these developments heading the judiciary down
a decidedly political path-the prominence of popular election as the
method of selecting judges, the vastly increased flow of money into ju-
dicial elections, and newly minted First Amendment protection for test-
ing judicial candidates' political views-the Court stopped everything
for political organization or candidate), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 209 (2012); Wolfson v.
Concannon, 750 F.3d 1145, 1157-60 (9th Cir. 2014) (candidate successfully challenged Arizo-
na's non-endorsement clause, non-solicitation clause, and clauses prohibiting candidates from
making speeches or soliciting funds for political organizations and from participating in the
campaigns of others); Sanders Cnty. Republican Party v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir.
2012) (Republican Party successfully challenged Montana law criminalizing party endorsement
of judicial candidates); Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir. 2009)
(political action committee and candidates challenged Kansas' pledges or promises clause and
non-solicitation clause but claims were mooted when Kansas revised the former and eliminated
the latter); Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir.
2007) (political organization challenged Alaska's pledges or promises clause and disqualification
rule requiring recusal if impartiality can reasonably be questioned, and court found challenges
not ripe); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (candidate and voter
successfully challenged Georgia's non-solicitation clause and clause prohibiting false state-
ments). The case of O'Neillv. Cough/an, 511 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2008), presents a certain irony. In
O'Neill, the candidate was a sitting judge seeking elevation by election to the Ohio Supreme
Court. Id. at 639. His campaign theme was "Money and judges don't mix," and to that end he
supported campaign finance reform and refused any donation over $10. His website included
the statement: "The time has come to end the public's suspicion that political contributions
influence court decisions. The election of Judge O'Neill is the best step toward sending the
message, 'This Court is Not For Sale!"' Id. The Cuyahoga County Republican Party then
brought a grievance against him, alleging that he had violated, inter alia, the Ohio Code's non-
affiliation clause and a clause prohibiting statements that impugn the judiciary. Id. at 639-40. So
Judge O'Neill brought suit challenging those clauses under the First Amendment, but the fed-
eral court ultimately found that it should abstain under the doctrine of Younger v. Hamis, 401
U.S. 37 (1971). See id. at 643-44.
133 See, e.g., Bauer, 620 F.3d at 718 (upholding pledges or promises and non-solicitation claus-
es); Siefert, 608 F.3d at 990 (upholding non-solicitation and non-endorsement clauses); Wersal,
674 F.3d at 1028-30 (upholding non-endorsement clause and clause prohibiting solicitation for
political organization).
134 See White, supra note 123, at 108; see also Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d at
1248 (noting that Kansas eliminated its non-solicitation rule); Bauer, 620 F.3d at 708-09 (noting
that Indiana substantially modified its pledge or promises clause). A similar fear of litigation
may explain why more states have not adopted the provisions of the Model Code-Rules
2.11 (A)(4) and (5)-requiring a judge to disqualify herself or himself when a litigant has made a
certain level of campaign contribution or when the judge has made statements that appear to
have pre-committed the judge on a matter before the court. See supra notes 34-41 and accom-
panying text.
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III. CAPERTON'S IMPACT ON JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
A. The Decision Itsef
In Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co.,"' a West Virginia jury found
that Massey Coal Company had committed fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, concealment and tortious interference, and awarded plaintiff Hugh
Caperton $50 million in damages.136 Massey Coal filed post-trial mo-
tions challenging both the verdict and the damages award and seeking
judgment as a matter of law. 37 While these were pending in the trial
court, Massey Coal's CEO, Don Blankenship, contributed $3 million to
a candidate for the West Virginia Court Supreme Court of Appeals.
131
Blankenship's $3 million contribution was more than all of his candi-
date's other contributions combined, 139 and Caperton alleged it exceed-
ed the combined expenditures of both candidates' campaign committees
by a full million dollars.'
40
The candidate supported by Blankenship, Brent Benjamin, unseat-
ed the incumbent and shortly thereafter proceeded to take up the case
of his largest campaign contributor. 14' Caperton moved now-Justice
Benjamin to recuse himself,142 but Benjamin denied the motion.143 Ul-
timately, the jury verdict was overturned, on a vote of 3-2, with Benja-
min voting in favor of the defendant, Blankenship's company.
44
135 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
136 Id. at 872.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 873.
139 Id.
140 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
141 Id. at 873-74. Of 716,337 votes cast, Benjamin won 53.3%, to 46.7% for the incumbent
justice McGraw. Id. at 873.
142 Id. at 873-74. Invoking both the due process clause and the West Virginia Code of Judi-
cial Conduct, Caperton actually moved for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself before Massey
Coal had even filed the appeal.
143 Id. at 874.
144 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875. Massey Coal's appeal was actually heard twice. When the ap-
peal was first heard, Caperton moved to disqualify the judge, Benjamin, and Benjamin himself
denied the motion. Id. at 873-74. The court then voted 3-2 against Caperton. Id. at 874.
Caperton moved for rehearing, and this time two judges other than Benjamin recused, one be-
cause he had vacationed with Blankenship and one because he had pubicly criticized Blanken-
ship's role in the election of Benjamin. Id. at 874-75. The step-aside caused Benjamin to as-
sume the role of Chief Justice, so he appointed two substitute justices. Id. at 875. The vote,
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Caperton brought the case to the United States Supreme Court on
a due process claim. 45 While the case was pending in the Supreme
Court, four months after the opinion below had issued, Benjamin filed
a concurring opinion in the West Virginia court.146 The judge stated that
he had no 'direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest' in the
case. 14' He refused to consider whether he should recuse under an
"appearance of propriety" standard, on the ground that such a standard
would allow judges to be challenged too easily.148
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Benjamin's failure to
recuse himself violated Caperton's right to due process. 4 9 The Court
split 5-4.150 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority and was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg.15 ' Chief Justice Roberts
wrote a dissent joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, and Justice
Scalia additionally filed his own."'
The majority reviewed the Court's precedent on the due process
requirement of an impartial tribunal.5 3 That precedent fell into three
categories. The first, and oldest, was drawn from Tumey v. Ohio,'54 and
called for a judge's disqualification whenever the judge had a "direct
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in a case or one of its parties.
These cases, Justice Kennedy wrote, derived from the common law
principle that a man could not .'be a judge in his own cause; because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, cor-
rupt his integrity."",155 They were about a judge's immediate and direct
gain, and not at all about relational bias or prejudice, because under the
common law, "'matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remote-
ness of interest, would seem generally to be matters of legislative discre-
however, remained 3-2. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875. The opinion issued was a modified version of
the original, and was written by a judge other than Benjamin. Id.
145 See id. at 876.
146 Id.
147 Id. (quoting A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008)).
148 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876.
149 See id. at 890.
150 See id. at 871, 890.
151 See id. at 871.
152 See id. at 890, 902.
153 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876-81.
154 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
155 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876-77 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (J. Madison)) U.
Cooke ed. 1961).
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The other two categories of cases the Court identified had arisen
since Tumey, and were, in the majority's view, distinct from Tumey's "di-
rect interest" precedent. They reflected "new problems" that were not
discussed at common law, and they involved "circumstances 'in which
experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."
1 15 7
In the first of these "probability-of-bias" categories, a judge had a fi-
nancial interest in the outcome of a case that would not have risen to
the level of a "direct" interest at common law but would still present
the likelihood of bias." 8 In the second category, the concern with the
judge's bias was not financial in any way. The cases involved criminal
contempt citations in situations where the judge had suffered a personal
challenge incompatible with neutrality.'59 From its survey of this prece-
dent, the Caperton majority concluded that the Court had long con-
cerned itself with an objective appearance of fairness: "the inquiry is an
objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjec-
tively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is 'likely' to
be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 'potential for bi-
as."")160
In the majority's view, even apart from the precedent, an objective
approach was the wisest. The Court noted that actual bias was not only
very difficult for a litigant to prove but very hard even for a judge to
root out on his or her own. 16' An objective standard protected litigants
against judges who could not or would not acknowledge their own
prejudicial motives. 62 Thus, the courts should ask "whether 'under a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,' the
interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the prac-
tice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be ade-
156 Id. at 877.
157 Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
158 See id. at 877-79 (Part I.A). An example was Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), in
which the judge was also the mayor, and as mayor stood to benefit from the fact that the fines
the court levied went into the village's coffers.
159 See id. at 880-81 (Part 1IB).
160 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66
(1971)).
161 Id. at 883.
162 Id.
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quately implemented." 163
With that established, the Court concluded that Justice Benjamin
violated Caperton's right to due process by failing to recuse himself
from the case. Justice Kennedy wrote: "We conclude that there is a se-
rious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable percep-
tions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the
case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when
the case was pending or imminent.' ' 64 The Court indicated that it had
considered a number of factors: the size of the contribution, both in it-
self and in relative terms, and the timing of the contributions, the elec-
tion, and the case appeal.'65 In the end, notwithstanding Benjamin's in-
sistence that he was not influenced in the case, he should have
withdrawn: "Due process 'may sometimes bar trial by judges who have
no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of
justice equally between contending parties."'"66
The Chief Justice's dissent objected strenuously to the majority's
adoption of a "probability of bias" standard for due process viola-
tions.16 The Chief Justice agreed that there was a need "to maintain a
fair, independent and impartial judiciary-and one that appears to be
such," but felt that doing so was best left to legislation and court
rules. 168 According to the Chief Justice, the Court had previously recog-
nized only two exceptions to the showing of actual bias normally re-
quired for a due process violation-those reflected in the financial in-
terest and criminal contempt cases-and had "never" relied on the
"vaguer notions of bias or the appearance of bias" employed by the
majority. 169
In a particularly pointed section, the Chief Justice criticized the
breadth and ambiguity of the majority's standard.' 0 To illustrate the
majority's failure "to provide clear, workable guidance for future cas-
es,'' he set forth forty questions a court might have to resolve in or-
163 Id. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
164 Id. at 884.
165 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884-86.
166 Id. at 881 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
167 See id. at 890 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893-99.
171 Id. at 893.
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der to determine whether a probability of bias existed, and many of the
questions suggested that the endeavor could become arbitrary.1 2 In the
end, the dissent warned, the majority's expansion of due process would
result in a flood of groundless allegations that judges are biased and
thereby "do far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality
than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case."' 73
The majority downplayed the dissent's alarm. The Court pointed
out that the earlier due process cases "raised questions similar to those
that might be asked after our decision today," and yet the Court was
not "flooded" with motions based on those cases.174 Further, the facts
in Caperton were "extreme by any measure," '175 and so would ordinarily
end up being addressed by judicial codes and disqualification statutes
without ever rising to constitutional adjudication.'76 Justice Kennedy
wrote that "[a]pplication of the constitutional standard implicated in
this case will thus be confined to rare instances.)1 77
172 See id. at 893-98.
173 Id. at 891. Justice Scalia's dissent echoed this point by the Chief Justice, asserting that the
public is fired of never-ending litigation and that by constitutionalizing recusal decisions, the
majority added weight to that complaint. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He wrote: "Divinely
inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due Process Clause most
assuredly does not. The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair
all imperfections through the Constitution." Caperton, 556 U.S. at 903.
174 Id. at 888. Justice Kennedy appears to have had the better of this argument. In five years,
all across the country, the case has been cited in fewer than 350 cases, and discussed at any
meaningful length in only about 100 of those. For a frame of reference drawn from
WesdawNext, Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), was decided at the same time as Caperton
and held that police could subject passengers in a vehicle stopped for a traffic infraction to a
Terry "stop and frisk." It has been cited since 2009 over 700 times. Perhaps more to the point,
one might consider Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), itself a due process case based on ju-
dicial bias. In 39 years, it has been cited in 2009 cases. Or one might consider Citizenr United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Decided nine months after Caperton, it has been cited in 10,000 cas-
es. So it hardly seems that the 300-plus cases that have invoked Caperton are excessive.
175 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887.
176 See id. at 890. The majority's idea that a flood of cases would not be brought because
they would previously have been resolved by resort to codes of conduct and disqualification
statutes was limited conceptually. Certainly some due process cases would fall to the wayside
when a litigant succeeded in disqualifying a judge because a state or the federal system had adopt-
ed more rigorous standards. This would not work the other way, however: when a judge is not
disqualified, if there is a due process possibility available, presumably the litigant will not quit
but will keep litigating the question into a due process posture.
177 Id.
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B. Caperton's Impact on State Disqualificalion Procedures
Theoretically, Caperton should not have had that much of an im-
pact. As the majority noted, virtually every state had adopted the ethical
directive that a judge avoid not just impropriety, but the appearance of
impropriety.178 More specifically, in virtually every state-including
West Virginia--disqualification rules already required judges to disquali-
fy themselves whenever "the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." '79 So if these constraints had been functioning properly,
there would have been no Caperton case, and no need for a due process
violation lying atop a jurisdiction's ethical rules.18
178 Id. at 888.
179 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. Indeed, the fact that the states already had
experience with the standard announced in Caperton belied the Chief Justice's remark that the
majority's standard did not provide "clear, workable guidance." Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893 (Rob-
erts, C.J., dissenting). A few courts have given the decision what can only be called a cramped
reading. See, e.g., State v. Shackleford, 314 P.3d 136, 140-41 (Idaho 2013) (limiting Caperton to
campaign contribution context); State v. Munguia, 253 P.3d 1082, 1088 n.13 (Utah 2011) (sug-
gesting that Caperton would not reach personal bias or prejudice). But for the most part, the
courts have smoothly accepted that a due process claim lies alongside their state rules and pro-
ceeded to evaluate the probability of bias. See, e.g., Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 792 (9th Cir.
2014) ("We must ask whether the average judge, in Judge Hilliard's position, was likely to sit as
a neutral, unbiased arbiter or whether there existed an unconstitutional risk of bias.") (citing
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881); Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cit. 2013) ("The bias inquiry
is objective, asking 'whether the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether
there is an unconstitutional potential for bias."') (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872, 881) (citing
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (1964)); South Dakota v. United States Dep't of Interior,
775 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (D.S.D. 2011) ("an unconstitutional probability of bias involves an
objective inquiry, based on whether 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice
must be forbidden."') (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 47 (1975)); Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Office of Educ., 303 P.3d
1140, 1152 (Cal. 2013) ("Conclusive proof of actual bias is not required; an objective, intolera-
bly high risk of actual bias will suffice."). Two have even remarked that the Caperton standard
is not especially different from the due process standard in place for some time. See First Bank
of Tennessee v. Hill, 340 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tenn. 2010) ("Caperton adds nothing to Tennessee
law-well-established Tennessee law recognizes' recusal is also appropriate "when a person of
ordinary prudence in the judge's position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would
find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality."') (quoting Davis v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 820 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1994)); Henry v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, No. 3:06-CV-33, 2009 WL 2857819, at
*3 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 2, 2009 ) ("this Court finds that while the Supreme Court may have found
it appropriate to clarify the law in light of the extreme circumstances Caperton presented, it did
not alter the substantive law as applied by this Court in evaluating plaintiffs' claims").
180 See State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 882 (IWis. 2010) (opinion of Abrahamson, C.J., and
Bradley, Crooks, JJ.) ("[I]f the West Virginia court had been willing to keep its own house in
JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
As the egregiousness of the case shows, however, the constraints
were not functioning properly, primarily because West Virginia and nu-
merous other states had been allowing judges to decide individually,
without any full court back-up, whether their impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned.' Presumably, had there been full court review at
the state supreme court level in the Caperton case, the other justices
would not have limited their consideration to Justice Benjamin's actual
prejudice, as he did."2 And applying the proper, "reasonable question"
standard, they might well have found that he should not sit.
Thus, just by constitutionalizing the disqualification issue, and
without even expressly addressing the specific problem, the Court ad-
dressed this state court dysfunction. By making impartiality more
broadly a matter of due process, the Court set up potential federal re-
view of every disqualification decision, review that would not exist if
impartiality were left solely to state disqualification statutes and state
codes of conduct. Further, even without the possibility of federal re-
view looming, the states would essentially have to change their proce-
dure: there was no precedent for leaving what was now a consitutional
decision in the hands of a single justice who was actually the subject of
the constitutional complaint.
183
So this aspect of Caperton-even as it went unspoken-has pro-
vided a powerful impetus for the states to alter the way disqualification
decisions are made on their highest courts and allow for full court re-
view. Michigan has already made the change, specifically in response to
Caperton.'84 And in August 2014, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
order, no due process violation would have occurred and review by the United States Supreme
Court would not have been necessary.").
181 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
183 See State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d at 908 (opinion of Abrahamson, C.J., and Bradley, Crooks,
JJ.) ("Those high courts which have, in the past, chosen not to review the recusal decisions of
individual justices must now contend with how they will guarantee due process in the wake of
Caperton."); Todd C. Berg, MSC Recusal Rule May Not be Constitutional, MICH-. LAWYERS WEEKLY,
June 15, 2009, at 23 (quoting former Michigan Supreme Court Justice Clifford Taylor as saying
Caperton "'has to mean that the challenged justice can't make the recusal decision alone"), avail-
able at http://milawyersweekly.com/news/2009/06/15/msc-recusal-rule-may-not-be-constituti
onal; see also U.S. Fidelity Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d
243, 246 (Mich. 2009) (discussing the ramifications of Caperton).
184 See MiCH. CoMip. LAWS, MICH. COURT RULE 2.003(D)(3)(b) (as amended November
2009). The Michigan Rules allow the challenged justice to address the motion first, but if it is
denied, the movant can ask for full court consideration. Id. The state's new substantive standard
actually incorporates Caperton by reference. Id., Rule 2.003(C)(1)(b) ("Disqualification of a judge
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a resolution urging states to adopt disqualification rules that both ad-
dress campaign contributions and include procedures by which deci-
sions are made "independent of the subject judge." '185
C. The Decision as a Limit on Po/iticized Judges
Apart from this procedural ramification, Caperton placed a substan-
tial block in the path of those who would intentionally convert the judi-
ciary into another political branch. Particularly in light of its timing, the
decision was a powerful response to the First Amendment latitude the
Court had given judicial campaigning. For the decision brought under
the microscope not only the issue of campaign contributions, but any
campaign activity that might make a judge appear less than impartial. It
was as though the Court said: the First Amendment may allow you to
politick all you wish outside the courtroom, but once here, you will face
the consequences for what your politicking says about your ability to be
impartial.
Had the decision gone the other way, the new, political judiciary
would have been fully constructed. Justices would be able to campaign
entirely on their political positions, raise enormous amounts from spe-
cial interest groups, endorse slates of like-minded candidates and as-
is warranted [if the judge], based on objective and reasonable perceptions, has ... (i) a serious
risk of actual bias impacting the due process rights of a party as enunciated in Caperton"). With
that said, at least one of the Michigan judges is refusing to follow the new rule, claiming that it
is unconstitutional and pointing to the United States Supreme Court practice. See Pellegrino v.
Ampco Sys. Parking, 807 N.W.2d 40, 41 (Mich. 2009) (Young, J.).
185 ABA House of Delegates Resolution 105C (adopted August 12, 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/ 2 014am-hodres/105c.pdf.
The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges that states and territories
adopt judicial disqualification and recusal procedures which: (1) take into account the
fact that certain campaign expenditures and contributions, including independent ex-
penditures, made during judicial elections raise concerns about possible effects on ju-
dicial impartiality and independence; (2) are transparent; (3) provide for the timely
resolution of disqualification and recusal motions; and (4) include a mechanism for
the timely review of denials to disqualify or recuse that is independent of the subject
judge; and
RESOLVED FURTHER, That the American Bar Association urges all states and
territories 9 to provide guidance and training to judges in deciding disqualifica-
tion/recusal motions.
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sume the bench together, and then, once on the bench, use their major-
ity to find that their political leanings, no matter how extreme, did not
establish that they were biased.
A recent criminal case demonstrates this potential well. In People
v. Navoy,8 6 the defendant was charged with possession of marijuana
and planned to defend on the ground that his possession was legal un-
der the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act.'87 The judge assigned to his
case, however, had been very vocal about his opposition to the Act. He
had referred to marijuana on multiple occasions as "the devil's weed,"
"Satan's surge," and "Satan's weed."' 88 He had repeatedly lectured de-
fendants that they were supporting drug cartels and murders in Mexi-
co.189 In a prior case, he had declared the Act unconstitutional in its en-
tirety and foreclosed the defendant's defense, and he had appeared on
television discussing his belief in that regard, calling the law "unfavora-
ble and problematic."'' 9' On appeal, the court held that allowing the
judge to hear the case would violate due process under Caperton: "Alt-
hough [the judge] may still allow defendant to present evidence in sup-
port of his defense under the MMMA, this predisposed belief regarding
the unconstitutionality of this law creates a serious risk that actual bias
exists, and will, in effect, hamper defendant's due process rights."'191 In
the absence of Caperton, a defendant such as Navoy would have no fed-
eral constitutional claim, and in the event of a recalcitrant, politically
zealous state bench, would have no recourse.
D. The Courts' Increased Candor About Bias
Of course, just as Caperton rebuffed the overtly political, it spoke as
well to an altogether different audience. Specifically, the decision drove
home the idea that judges might well be biased even when they did not
think so. In so doing it depersonalized the disqualification issue, and in
turn gave greater value to the public's perception of the bench.
In the years prior to Caperton, most states already had laws calling
for recusal when a judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned.
Further, the cases from which Caperton's holding ultimately would be
186 No. 311069, 2013 WL 6037167 (Mich. App. Nov. 14, 2013).
187 Id. at *3.
188 Id. at *1.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 People v. Navoy, No. 311069, 2013 WL 6037167 *4 (Mich. App. Nov. 14, 2013).
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drawn were already on the books. Yet in app ying the probability of bias
standard as it existed, the lower courts seemed to look for most any
reason not to find disqualifying bias.
Some of the results were simply shocking. In Dyas v. Lockhart,'92
the judge presided over a capital murder trial in which the three prose-
cuting attorneys were the judge's nephew, brother, and son.193 The
Eighth Circuit applied the proper standard, asking whether there was an
"unconstitutionally high probability of actual bias, ' ' and just some-
how found there was not. The court wrote:
the Prosecuting Attorneys were acting in the interest of the State of
Arkansas, not in their own personal, financial interests. Further-
more, the relationship here does not necessarily suggest that Judge
Steele had such a strong personal or financial interest in the out-
come of the trial that he was unable to hold the proper balance be-
tween the state and the accused.'
95
In Fero v. Kerby,' 96 the judge's son worked as a law clerk for the
prosecution during the trial, the judge's brother-in-law filed a wrongful
death action against the defendant on behalf of the victim's family two
weeks before trial began, and the judge's wife was a school nurse alleg-
edly under the supervision of the victim. 97 On these facts, the trial
judge refused to recuse himself, and so did every single court up the di-
rect appeal and habeas corpus chain, 198 including the Tenth Circuit.
The court held that those circumstances were not such as would "lead
the average judge not to hold the balance nice, clear and true." 199
In Richardson v. Quarterman,0 ° the judge's wife was also a judge, and
she knew the murder victim from their mutual membership in the Jun-
ior League.a0' The judge and his wife had once been to a party along
with the victim and the defendant, and had had discussions about the
192 705 F.2d 993 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 982 (1983).
193 Id. at 995.
194 See id. at 996-97.
195 Id. at 997.
196 39 F.3d 1462 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1122 (1995).
197 Id. at 1475.
198 See id. at 1475, 1477.
199 Idat 1480 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
20 537 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1173 (2009). Notably, the petition for
writ of certiorari was pending with the Supreme Court while the Caperton case was under con-
sideration.
201 See id. at 468-69.
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amount of the bond set by an earlier judge.21 2 The wife had received
numerous calls from friends of the victim complaining about the
amount of the bond, and the wife had attended the victim's funeral.20 3
Despite all this, the trial judge declined to recuse himself, an administra-
tive judge declined to disqualify him,204 and the Fifth Circuit ultimately
held that the circumstances were not such as to tempt the average judge
to be biased.20 5
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Caperton almost necessarily called the-
se cases into question, because it spoke candidly about the process of
judging, and emphasized that judges are not superhuman. Judges "often
inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in the ordinary
course of deciding a case," Justice Kennedy wrote, but "[t]his does not
mean the inquiry is a simple one., 2°6 And judges may simply "misreadH
or misapprehendl the real motives at work in deciding" a case.207 For
this reason, an objective inquiry is necessary, and it must include "'a re-
alistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness.' 20 8
In the cases that have been handed down since Caperton, it seems
that at least some courts have begun to adopt this more realistic, and
honest, approach to judging. In Florida Parishes Juvenile Justice Commission
ex rel. Florida Parishes Juvenile Justice District v. Hannis T. Bourgeois, LLP,209
the court disqualified the judges from an entire judicial district from
hearing a case because those judges had appointed two of the members
of the commission who was a party.210 Applying Caperton, the appellate
court was matter-of-fact and impersonal: "it is logical to conclude that
the judges of the 21St JDC would be biased in favor of witnesses they
appointed to the Commission, and whose actions are now at issue.
' 21
'
The court in State v. Sanye? 12 was similarly businesslike. The de-
fendant in Sanyer had been assigned the trial judge twice previously,
202 See id. at 469.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 468.
205 Richardson, 537 F.3d at 476 ("this is not the type of 'possible temptation' that would lead
the average judge 'not to hold the balance nice, clear and true"') (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)).
206 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882.
207 Id. at 883.
208 Id. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
209 102 So. 3d 860 (La. App.), wnrit denied, 104 So. 3d 442 (La. 2012).
210 See id. at 862.
211 Id.
212 305 P.3d 608 (Kan. 2013).
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first for a jury trial and then for a bench trial. The judge had presided
over the first, but recused from the second, on the ground that he
could retain an impartiality in a jury trial that would not be possible as
the trier of fact. On this third occasion, again a jury trial, the judge de-
clined to recuse himself, and the chief trial court judge upheld his deci-
sion. 213 The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed. The court noted that the
judge had displayed an intemperate demeanor in the defendant's origi-
nal sentencing 214 and simply rejected the idea that a judge could step out
of that mindset for a jury trial even as he knew he could not for a
bench trial.215 The court wrote: "Our experience teaches us that the
probability of actual bias in this case was 'too high to be tolerable' un-
der the Due Process Clause. The proceeding sank 'beneath the consti-
tutional floor.'
' 216
At the federal level, one can see Caperton's effect in Hurles v.
Ryan.217 In Hurles, an Arizona judge denied motion for co-counsel in
capital murder case in which the death penalty was being sought. The
trial lawyer took an immediate appeal from that decision, and as a for-
mality named the judge as the opposing party, whereupon the judge
contacted the state attorney general's office and ultimately filed a briefdefending her decision. 218 After the Arizona appellate court scolded the
judge for attempting to participate personally in the appeal,219 the judge
sat on every aspect of Hurles' case: the trial (at which she personally
performed the sentencing function and sentenced Hurles to death), and
the first and second postconviction reviews. Hurles raised the issue of
judicial bias on postconviction review, but the Arizona Supreme Court
summarily affirmed the judge's rulings both times.220
On federal habeas review, the Ninth Circuit not only remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing, but held flatly that once Hurles' al-
213 Id. at 610.
214 See id. at 614.
215 Id. ("The bottom line is this: No distinction between the role of a trial judge in a criminal
jury trial versus his or her role in a criminal bench trial mitigates an acknowledged preexisting
bias or prejudice.").
216 Id. at 614-15 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889).
217 752 F.3d 768 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 2722 (2014).
218 See id. at 775-76.
219 Id. at 776 (the Arizona Court of Appeals wrote ."at every level of the judiciary, judges are
presumed to recognize that they must do the best they can, ruling by ruling, with no personal
stake-and surely no jusidable stake-in whether they are ultimately affirmed or reversed"')
(quoting Hurles v. Superior Court, 849 P.2d 1,4 (Ariz. App. 1993)).
220 See id. at 777.
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legations of judicial bias were formally proved, he would be entitled to
relief.2 ' Citing Caperton, the court asked whether "the average judge, in
[this] position, was likely to sit as a neutral, unbiased arbiter," and
found that the average judge could not.222 In the Ninth Circuit's view,
the judge's filing of the brief, the brief's tone, and the judge's involve-
ment with the state attorney general's office all suggested that the judge
had become sufficiently personally embroiled in controversy with
Hurles that the risk of bias was too high.223
These cases seem to indicate that Caperton has helped renew the
courts' commitment to impartiality. The judges involved were not ap-
proached from a place of criticism. Rather it is becoming understood-
treated as "logical," as the Florida Parishes court so succinctly said
224
-
that judges will be tempted to bias by their personal, social and business
relationships no matter their desire not to be, and that it is better to be
forthright about that than continue to pretend.
Indeed, a few of the courts since Caperton have stepped out even
further in advancing judicial impartiality. In these cases, not only have
the courts asked the operative question-whether the average judge
was likely to be impartial-but they have chosen in close cases to err on
the side of substitution. In Tatham v. Rogers,225 for example, the court
reversed a judgment where one of the attorneys was the judge's former
law partner, and the judge held a durable power of attorney for her.226
The court concluded that there was "a greater risk of unfairness in up-
holding the judgment in this case than there is in allowing a new judge
to take a look at the issues. 2 27 Similarly, in People v. Houthoofd,28 the
court overturned a sentence because the judge had been expressly, ra-
ther than randomly, reassigned to the case after her first sentence had
been overturned on appeal.229 Citing Caperton, the court held that "the
221 See id. at 792.
222 Id.
223 See id.
224 Florida Parishes v. Hannis 7. Bourgeois, LLP., 102 So. 3d 860, 862 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
225 283 P.3d 583 (Wash. App. 2012).
226 See id. at 598-99. Tatham was not decided technically as a due process case because the
court did not find the violation sufficiently extreme to warrant such a finding, but the court dis-
cussed Caperton and employed Washington's appearance of fairness doctrine, which is identical
to the standard in Caperton. See id. at 594-95.
227 Id. at 600.
228 No. 312977, 2014 WL 667802 (Mich. App. 2014), appeal denied, 849 N.W.2d 376 (Mich.
2014).
229 See id. at 5.
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interests of impartiality" could be served only by random assignment.230
These decisions reflect a simple but appealing proposition: if there
is any question, the courts should err, from the beginning, on the side
of recusal. It is a notion that fairly jumps out at the reader in so many
of these cases: "why didn't the judge just recuse in the first place? It
would have been so simple just to step out." Hopefully, Caperton will
move the courts further in that direction.
IV. THE NEED FOR ToP-DowN, SUPREME COURT REFORM BEYOND
CAPERTON
Caperton has acted as a substantial counter to the politicization of
the judiciary. By clarifying that due process requires recusal whenever
there is a high probability that a judge is biased-not just in a few iso-
lated fact settings-the Court has made states look at their disqualifica-
tion law both procedurally and substantively. And the trend seems to
bode well for judicial impartiality. It appears that the states who do not
already have it may turn increasingly to full court review of disqualifica-
tion decisions. There has already been, and will surely continue to be,
greater scrutiny of campaign contribution influence. There are indica-
tions that with a broad due process standard as back-up, the courts may
become less tolerant of political rigidity on the bench, and adopt a
more honest approach to judicial bias.
But whatever positive changes Caperton has wrought thus far, the
American people remain decidedly unhappy with the judiciary. At the
state level, a number consistently upward of 70% say campaign contri-
butions influence the decision of cases. 231 For the last eight years, less
than 40% of the American public has reported confidence in the Su-
preme Court,232 and in just the last three years, that number has
dropped from 37% to 30%.233 60% of Americans believe that Supreme
Court justices act on their own political agenda rather than impartially
apply the law. 3
230 Id.
231 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
232 Justin McCarthy, Americans Losing Confidence in All Branches of Government, June 30, 2014,
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/171992/americans-losing-confidence-branches-gov.as
px?utm-source =alert&utmmedium=email&utm campaign=syndication&utmcontent= more
link&utm term=Politics at 3 (visited July 21, 2014). (From 1973-2006, confidence levels in the
Court ranged from 40-56%. They have not broken 40% since that time.) Id.
233 Id.
234 Rasmussen Reports, 60% Think Supreme Court Jusices Have Political Agenda, Sept. 28, 2013,
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This public perception that the courts do not behave impartially-
are not fair, as institutions-is dangerous. We have always depended
upon the judiciary's legitimacy to enforce the most controversial deci-
sions that have been made-Brown v. Board of Education,235 United States v.
Nixon g36 Roe v. Wade,2 37 Bush v. Gore23 -- and that legitimacy depends on
the country's sense that its top court is committed to fairness. This
would seem especially true given our current hyperpolarized state polit-
ically. 39
In the face of this crisis in public confidence, it cannot escape no-
tice that the Supreme Court itself has not risen to the bar of impartiality
that its own decision set.
A. The Court's Recent Histoy on Disqualification
As described above, the Supreme Court follows an internal prac-
tice of letting each justice decide individually whether 28 U.S.C. § 455
requires his or her disqualification. 4 ° Beyond that policy, there does not
appear to be any requirement that a justice explain his or her decision
to remain on a case in the face of objection. As a result, there are only
three recent statements offering insight into the justices' approach to
disqualification, one from Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2000, one from
Justice Scalia in 2004, and one from Chief Justice Roberts in 2011.
In Microsoft Corporation v. United States,24t Microsoft asked the Court
for immediate review of a district court decision finding that the com-
pany had violated the antitrust laws and ordering it to reorganize and
divest itself of certain divisions.42 At the time, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/generalpolitics/sept
ember_2013/60_think supreme_court_justices-have-political agenda ("Most Americans con-
tinue to believe the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court let their own political beliefs guide their
decisions.").
235 348 U.S. 886 (1954).
236 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
237 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
238 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
239 See Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Political Polarization and the American
Public, June 12, 2014, at 1 ("Republicans and Democrats are more divided among ideological
lines-and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive-than at any point in the last two
decades."), available at http: / /www.people-press.org/ 2 014/ 06 /12 / political-polarization-in-the-
american-public.
240 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
241 530 U.S. 1301 (2000).
242 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-74 (D.D.C. 2000).
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son was a partner in the Boston firm of Goodwin, Procter & Hoar,
which had been retained by Microsoft "in Boston as local counsel in
private antitrust litigation. '2 43 When the Court denied Microsoft's mo-
tion for immediate review, the Chief Justice attached to the one-
sentence denial a statement explaining that he had participated in the
decision.244
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that he need not recuse because
"a well-informed individual would [not] conclude that an appearance of
impropriety exists simply because my son represents, in another case, a
party that is also party to litigation pending in this Court. 2 4' He
acknowledged that "[a] decision by this Court as to Microsoft's antitrust
liability could have a significant effect on Microsoft's exposure to anti-
trust suits in other courts," but did not find that good enough reason to
recuse.246 Instead, it was a natural byproduct of being the nation's high-
est court-"by virtue of this Court's position atop the Federal Judiciary,
the impact of many of our decisions is quite broad"-and so a "reason-
able" observer would not find any appearance of impropriety in his sit-
ting.247 The Chief Justice also noted the "negative impact" if a justice
unnecessarily recuses himself or herself: "Not only is the Court de-
prived of the participation of one of its nine Members, but the even
number of those remaining creates a risk of affirmance of a lower court
decision by an equally divided court.
2 48
Four years later, in Chene v. United States District Court,249 Justice
Scalia opted to respond in writing to the Sierra Club's request that he
recuse himself. In the underlying suit, Sierra Club and Judicial Watch
had sued the Vice-President and members of the National Energy Poi-
cy Development Group for violations of the Federal Advisory Com-
243 Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1301 (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.).
244 See id.
245 Id. at 1302. (Before evaluating recusal under the broad appearance standard of subsection
455(a), the Chief Justice addressed and rejected the application of subsection 455(b)(5)(iii),
which requires disqualification whenever a judge's child .'[ils known ... to have an interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."'). See id. at 1302 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii)). (He noted that his son neither his son nor his son's law firm had done
any work on the case before the Court, and were being paid an hourly rate for their work on
the private antitrust case). See id.
246 Id. at 1302-03.
247 Microsoft v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302-03 (2000)
248 Id. at 1303.
249 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
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mittee Act (FACA).250 The district court denied the defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss and ordered discovery to proceed,251 and when the
court of appeals would not hear the defendants' mandamus petition to
reverse the district court,25 2 they sought review in the Supreme Court.
The Sierra Club moved Justice Scalia to recuse himself for two reasons.
First, while the case was in the Supreme Court-literally less than a
month after certiorari had been granted-Justice Scalia went on a duck-
hunting trip to Louisiana with the Vice-President aboard Air Force
Two.253 Second, Justice Scalia had recused himself from an earlier
FACA case, and that was thought to be because he had taken a position
as Assistant Attorney General that FACA was unconstitutional as ap-
plied to presidential advisory groups.254 In moving Justice Scalia to
recuse, the Sierra Club was able to marshal an extraordinary array of
disapproving parties: twenty of the nation's thirty largest newspapers
had called on Justice Scalia to step aside, and none had spoken in sup-
port of his remaining on the case.255
Justice Scalia denied the motion in typically passionate style. After
a long recitation of the events of the trip, he treated the concern for his
impartiality as virtually preposterous: "Why would [my impartiality be
questioned] from my being in a sizable group of persons, in a hunting
camp with the Vice President, where I never hunted with him in the
same blind or had other opportunity for private conversation?" '256 His
exasperation at being questioned was palpable. "Washington officials
know the rules, and know that discussing with judges pending cases-
their own or anyone else's-is forbidden." '257
The charge was especially inappropriate, according to Justice Scal-
ia, because the Vice-President was being sued only in his official capaci-
ty. 258 It did not matter that whatever his capacity as a defendant, the al-
250 In re Richard B. Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
251 See id. at 1100.
252 See id. at 1109.
253 Motion To Recuse at 1-12, Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), No.
03-475, 2004 WL 397220.
254 Id. at 12.
255 Id.
256 Chengy, 531 U.S. at 916.
257 Id. at 923.
258 Id. at 916 ("[W]hile friendship is a ground for recusal of a justice where the personal for-
tune or freedom of the friend is at issue, it has traditionally not been a ground for recusal where
offlial action is at issue, no matter how important the official action was to ambitions or reputa-
tion of the Governmental officer.") (emphasis in original). No case was cited for this proposi-
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legations could be seen as challenging the Vice-President's reputation
and integrity. 2 9 Nor did it matter that a significant portion of the press
considered Scalia's actions to raise an appearance of impropriety.26 ° In
language hard not to find insulting, Scalia concluded these critics could
not be considered reasonable observers:
[Even those who understand the idea of official action] facilely as-
sume, contrary to all precedent, that in such suits mere political
damage (which they characterize as a destruction of Cheney's repu-
tation and integrity) is ground for recusal. Such a blast of largely in-
accurate and uninformed opinion cannot determine the recusal
question. It is well established that the recusal inquiry must be
"made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of
all the surrounding facts a icute 2 61g~csand circumstances.
At no point did it seem to occur to Justice Scalia that he or the
Vice-President might just have chosen to forego this one duck hunting
trip while Cheney's case was before the Court. Nor did he give serious
thought to the Sierra Club's proposition that any doubt should be re-
solved in favor of recusal:
That might be sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of Appeals..
. .There my place would be taken by another judge, and the case
would proceed normally. On the Supreme Court, however, the
consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight Justices,
raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself
unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented by the case.
262
Eight years after Cheny, during the term in which the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, nu-
merous political commentators called for the recusal of two of the jus-
tices. 263 Seventy-four Democratic members of Congress signed a letter
tion.
259 See id. at 918-19. Perhaps somewhat presaging his views on the merits, Justice Scalia ada-
mantly refused to see the suit as anything but a "'run-of-the-mill legal dispute about an adminis-
trative decision,"' or as having "any bearing on the reputation and integrity of Richard Cheney."
Id.
260 See id. at 923.
261 Id. at 924 (emphasis in original).
262 Id. at 915.
263 See John Gibeaut, Sitting Tbis One Out: Health Care Case Again Raises the Controvery ofJustices'
Recusal, ABA J., Mar. 2012, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/sitting-
this one out health care case again-raises-recusal-controversy. One of the parties or nu-
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addressed to Justice Clarence Thomas complaining that he had a con-
flict of interest inasmuch as his wife worked as a lobbyist seeking to
overturn the law and he had failed to disclose substantial income the
couple had received as a result of that work.264 Republican Senators ar-
gued publicly that Justice Elena Kagan should recuse herself because
she was Solicitor General when the first legal challenges to the Act were
being raised and e-mails suggested she may have been involved in
strategizing about defending it.
265
Notwithstanding the political commentary, none of the parties or
numerous amici in the case actually moved either justice to recuse, 26 6 so
there was no order concerning the allegations. Chief Justice Roberts did
essentially respond, though, in a rather unusual forum: his 2011 Year-
End Report to the Judiciary.267  In that Report, he described the Su-
preme Court's recusal process, and ultimately dismissed the critics:
I have complete confidence in the capability of my colleagues to de-
termine when recusal is warranted. They are jurists of exceptional
integrity and experience whose character and fitness have been ex-
amined through a rigorous appointment and confirmation process. I
know that they give careful consideration to any recusal questions
that arise in the course of their judicial duties. We are all deeply
committed to the common interest in preserving the Court's vital
role as an impartial tribunal governed by the rule of law.
268
He explained that the individual justices "decide for themselves
whether recusal is warranted under Section 455.,,269 They do so without
merous amici in the case actually moved either justice for recusal. Id.
264 Feicia Somnez, House Democrats say Justice Thomas Should Recuse Himsef in Health-Care Case,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2011, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/02/house-
democrats-say-justice-th.html.
265 See Jeff Sessions, Kagan Must Recuse Herself from Obamacare Case, NATIONAL REVIEW
ONLINE, Feb. 23, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/291832/kagan-must-
recuse-herself-obamacare-case-sen-jeff-sessions; Michael O'Brien, Hatch: Kagan Should Recuse
Herself from Any Challenge to Healthcare Reform, THE HILL (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/141897-hatch-kagan-should-recuse-herself
-from-any-challenge-to-healthcare.
266 Gibeaut, supra note 263.
267 Adam Liptak, Chief Jusice Defends Peers' Healing case on Health Law, N.Y. TiMiES, Dec. 31,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/us/chief-justice-backs-peers-decision-
to-hear-health-law-case.html; see also James Sample, Supreme Court Recusalfrom Marbuy to the Mod-
em Day, 26 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 99 (2013).
268 2011 Year-End Report, supra note 73, at 10.
269 Id. at 8.
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review, because there is "no higher court to review a Justice's decision
not to recuse. ,270 And the other justices do not sit in judgment on an-
other justice's decision, the Chief Justice wrote, because that "would
create an undesirable situation in which the Court could affect the out-
come of a case by selecting who among its Members may partici-
pate.
271
At first blush, the Chief Justice's explanation makes sense. There
are only nine justices. Eliminating one of them, particularly as the Court
happens to be constituted at the moment, raises a substantial possibility
of a tie vote, which in turn results in an automatic affirmance of the de-
cision below. So, the thinking goes, one would not want to give the jus-
tices the power to manipulate recusal in such a way as to manipulate the
ultimate substantive outcome.
On deeper evaluation, however, the Chief Justice's explanation is
seriously troubling. It actually suggests that the justices of the Supreme
Court cannot be expected to approach a recusal motion of one of their
fellows impartially. It implies that they would approach the recusal mo-
tion itse/f with a bias in favor of whichever position best advances their
preference in the underlying case!
That is surely not what the Chief Justice intended to convey. More
likely, the observation was intended to mean only that the justices' indi-
vidual consideration of recusal motions prevents any impression that a
recusal ruling was manipulated to secure an outcome. But even so, it
reflects a way that the Justices think about themselves that needs seri-
ous examination.
B. The Court's False Rationale forApproaching Recusal Diffierenty from
Others
In all three of the statements described here, the justices invoke
the notion that they must consider recusal differently because they
serve on the nation's highest court. All three men point to the potential
for a tie, which would result in an automatic affirmance, if a justice
recuses and only eight members are left. If that happens, as Justice Scal-
ia characterizes it, the Court will find itself "unable to resolve the signif-
icant legal issue presented by the case."
In reality, nothing suggests that a tie outcome is markedly more
270 Id.
271 Id. at 9.
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likely. In the last term, five cases were decided by only eight justices,
and none resulted in a tie or even a 5-3 vote. 272 Only ten cases, or 14%
of the term's caseload, were decided by a 5-4 vote.273 (In fact, the deci-
sion in the Microsoft case itself was at least 6-3,274 and the ultimate deci-
sion in the Chene case was 7-2.275) So this concern about a split court
seems a bit of a straw man, and certainly not a strong reason for a jus-
tice to err on the side of remaining in a case in spite of a controversial
association.
Further, if the United States Supreme Court is not a political body,
it is difficult to understand why it would matter so much if there were
one more 4-4 vote, one more automatic affirmance. The nature of the
judiciary is that appellate courts speak with one voice. The country
awaits, and accepts, the Court's outcomes whether the vote is 9-0, 5-4,
or 4-4 and therefore an automatic affirmance. So unless one views the
Supreme Court as a political, ideological battleground, the existence of
some automatic affirmances is not that troubling, and certainly does not
seem too high a price to pay to ensure that cases are not being heard
when the justices appear to the public not to be impartial. As far as the
duty Scalia invokes to "resolv[e] the significant legal issue, '276 that can
certainly wait until a future day, when the justices hearing the case can
readily say they are free from bias.
If the difficulty the Court claimed were real, there are solutions
short of hedging on disqualification. At the lower court levels, district
court judges frequently sit "by designation" on the courts of appeal un-
der 28 U.S.C. 5 292(a).277 If there is actually a substantial fear of that
272 See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (June 16, 2014) (decided
7-1, Justice Sotomayor not participating); POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct.
2228 (June 12, 2014) (decided 8-0, Justice Breyer not participating); EPA v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (Apr. 29, 2014) (decided 6-2, Justice Alito not participating);
Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (Apr. 22, 2014) (decided 6-2, Justice Kagan not participat-
ing); United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1395 (Mar. 25, 2014) (decided 8-0, Justice
Kagan not participating).
273 End-of-Term Statistical Ana~ysis for the Supreme Court's October Term 2013, 54 Cases, http://
news.bna.com.lawresearch.tamu.edu/lwln/coreadp/getobject/im226446.pdf (last visited Au-
gust 23, 2014) (compiled originally by SCOTUSBIog.com). This last term did see fewer 5-4 de-
cisions than any term in the last nine years, but even over that nine-year period, the average
number of 5-4 decisions is 17, or 21% of the total. Id.
274 The Mirosoft decision denied review, which means that the company was unable to get
four votes. Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1301.
275 See Cheney v. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 371 (2004).
276 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
277 See 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) ("The chief judge of a circuit may designate and assign one or
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split 4-4 Court, then a procedure could be adopted under which a judge
from the circuit courts could be named at the beginning of every term
(before any recusals are decided) to sit in place of any justice who later
finds a need to recuse.278
The sense that they are irreplaceable may cause some of the justic-
es to gasp at the thought. But with all respect, they should not consider
themselves irreplaceable to the point of applying the federal disqualifi-
cation statute differently to themselves without any language authoriz-
ing them to do so. In truth, they are supposed to serve as decidedly
non-political administrators of the law-calling balls and strikes, to
borrow the Chief Justice's own metaphor, at least as often as that is
possible279-and so it should not be unreasonable to allow substitution
of another such administrator when the impartiality of a justice is
placed in issue. Whatever the justices' reverence for it, it bears remem-
bering that the nine-justice model of the Court does not even come
from the Constitution. It comes from Congress,280 which has changed the
number of justices five times,28' from the original six.282 An even number
more district judges within the circuit to sit upon the court of appeals or a division thereof
whenever the business of that court so requires.").
278 An alternative proposal would have had retired Supreme Court justices sit. Then Senate
Judiciary Committee Chair Patrick Leahy introduced legislation to that effect in 2010. S. 3871,
111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010); Press Release, Patrick Leahy, United State Senator from Vermont,
Leahy Proposes Bill To Allow Retired Justices To Sit on Court by Designation (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-proposes-bill-to-allow-retired-justices-to-sit-on-
court-by-designation. Senator Leahy apparently got the idea from retired Justice Stevens, who
had years earlier discussed the idea with then-Chief Justice Rehnquist. Lisa T. McElroy & Mi-
chael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Poliy Implications of Proposals To Allow Retired Justices
To Sit y Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 83 n.7 (2011). It was never reported
out of the Judiciary Committee. See Bill Summary & Status, 11l th Cong. (2009-2010), S. 3871,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 1:s3871: (last visited Aug. 24, 2014).
279 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.,J., D.C. Circuit) ("it's my job to call balls and strikes").
280 See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a
Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a
quorum.').
281 The Federal Judicial Center provides a succinct summary on its website: ("The size of the
Supreme Court grew to accommodate the establishment of new circuits as the nation expand-
ed. In 1807 a seventh justice was added to the court, and in 1837 an eighth and ninth justice
joined the Supreme Court. The size of the Court reached its highest point in 1863 with the cre-
ation of a Tenth Circuit on the west coast and the appointment of a tenth justice. In 1866,
Congress reduced the size of the Court to seven justices and provided that no vacant seats be
filled until that number was reached. The number of sitting justices fell to eight before an act of
1869 provided for nine justices, one for each of the judicial circuits established in 1866. The
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of justices.
In the end, impartiality would be much better served if the Court
applied the disqualification statute as written. Better yet, it would serve
as a powerful example for the rest of the country if in cases of doubt,
the justices erred on the side of recusal. As described above, the lower
courts already seem to be seeing the wisdom of that approach.283
C. The Need for Full Court Review of Disqualiocation Decisions
The Court should also adopt a procedure providing for additional
review whenever a justice declines to recuse under 28 U.S.C. 5 455(a).
Given that the question under subsection (a) is whether a judge's im-
partiality might "reasonably" be questioned-an objective inquiry-
there simply is no reason that the decision cannot be reached by the full
bench on the merits just as any other decision is. Before Caperton, per-
haps it made sense to allow each justice to make his or her own deci-
sion, just as a matter of avoiding awkwardness. But it is hard to see how
what is now a constitutional question should be left in the hands of a
single justice.
Moreover, by opening disqualification decisions to the full bench,
the Court would set a powerful example of depersonalizing the disqual-
ification issue. The Court would give full recognition to the principle
that judges are human and will never reach perfect impartiality, but still
aspire to the ideal and care whether the public sees them as doing so.
This would seem especially important in light of emerging studies that
suggest in-group ideological bias in the Supreme Court justices' deci-
sions over a long period.284 Indeed, in cases like Florida Parishes, the low-
size of the Court has since remained the same.").
Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.
nsf/page/courtssupreme.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
282 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
1) ("the supreme court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and five associate
justices").
283 See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text. The idea of erring against all doubt would
not be new. In State ex rel. Short v. Martin, 125 P. 681 (Okla. 1927), the court quoted a decision
fifty years earlier from Indiana: 'Judges are by no means free from the infirmities of human
nature, and therefore it seems to us that a proper respect for the high positions they are called
upon to fill should induce them to avoid even a cause for suspicion of bias or prejudice, in the
discharge of their judicial duties."' Id. at 690 (quoting Joyce v. Whitney, 57 Ind. 550, 554
(1877)).
284 See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices Defend the Speech Thy
Hate?: In-Group Bias, Opportunism and the First Amendment, American Political Science Association
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er courts are acknowledging that subconscious bias, and the public's
concern over it, are facts of life, such that judges challenged for proba-
ble bias need not take it as a character attack.285
Perhaps if his colleagues had advised him on what his duck hunt-
ing trip might look like, there might not be such a gap between Justice
Scalia's views and the uniform opinion of national newspapers.
D. The Justices' PoliticalActivio: Pretending Impartiaioy While Fanning the
Flames of Partisanshb
Of course, when one surveys the Court's actions over the years,
one cannot help but wonder whether the bigger problem is that the jus-
tices do not truly care. Their actions suggest an embedded sense that
they are political actors, and that at least some of them actually support
the politicization of the judiciary. The Caperton decision was--despite
its universally appalling facts-only a 5-4 decision.286 In the White case,
seven years before Caperton, five justices concluded that judicial elec-
tions were not sufficiently different from political elections to warrant
modified first amendment treatment.287 In Citizens United v. FEC,28 one
year after Caperton, and a series of cases thereafter, the Court has con-
cluded that political influence was an insufficient interest to allow for
limiting corporate campaign contributions,"' and that case has already
been invoked by lower courts to strike down public financing of judicial
campaigns.290
More persuasive than any of that, however, is the political conduct
Annual Meeting Paper, at 13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2300572 (posted Aug. 6,
2013) ("justices are much less apt to defend the speech (and speakers) they dislike than the ex-
pression they like," and this "traces at least back to the Warren years").
285 See supra note 209-11 and accompanying text.
286 See spra note 150 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
288 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
289 See id. at 356-61; Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2825-28 (2011) (striking Arizona's law providing matching funds in statewide elections as
violative of the First Amendment); Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491
(2012) (summarily striking Montana ban on corporate campaign contributions in light of Citi-
zens Unitea).
290 See State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 516 (W. Va. 2012) ("We find noth-
ing in Bennett, nor in the relevant cases leading up to or decided after Bennett (Davis, Caperton,
Citizens United and Bullock), that supports Petitioner Loughry's position that the Supreme Court
has recognized or is inclined to find a judicial-election exception to its political speech jurispru-
dence generally or to its matching funds analysis specifically.").
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of the justices themselves. Several of the justices regularly engage in ac-
tivities that very arguably would violate both the federal code of ethics
and the codes of most of the states, were the justices subject to such
rules. To cite only a few of the numerous, well-documented examples,
(1) Justice Ginsburg was the featured speaker at the 2012 annual meet-
ing of the American Constitution Society, 291 and in 1998, she reportedly
contributed to the National Organization for Women for auction an
autographed copy of her decision in United States v. Virginia,292 (2) jus-
tice Alto was the featured speaker at the 2008 fundraising dinner of the
Republican political magazine The American Spectator, the highlight of
which reportedly was his send-up of Vice-President Elect Joe Biden, 93
(3) Justices Scalia and Thomas were featured speakers at the 2011 Fed-
eralist Society National Lawyers Convention, under the tide, "A Cele-
bration of Service, ' 294 and (4) Justice Scalia frequently speaks at local
Federalist Society events,2 9 holding private audiences with law student
291 See Nicole Flatow, At ACS Convention, Justice Ginsburg Demonstrates Humor, Touts Power of
Dissents, (une 16, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/at-acs-convention-justice-ginsburg-
demonstrates-humor-touts-power-of-dissents (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). The organization's
website describes it as working for "positive change" by "shaping debate on vitally important
legal and constitutional issues through development and promotion of high-impact ideas to
opinion leaders and the media; by building networks of lawyers, law students, judges and pol-
cymakers dedicated to those ideas; and by countering the activist conservative legal movement
that has sought to erode our enduring constitutional values." About AC, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, https://www.acslaw.org/about (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). Further,
"ACS generates 'intellectual capital' for ready use by progressive allies and shapes debates on
key legal and public policy issues." Id. Thus, there is hardly any question but that the organiza-
tion is political in nature.
292 See James Sample, supra note 267, at 124 (citing 1998 Women's Rights Convention and
Vision Summit, NOWPACS, http://www.nowpacs.org/events/auction98.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2012)). The page to which Professor Sample cited is no longer available.
293 SeeJay Homnick, Jusfice A/ito Pokes Fun of Biden at Dinner, HUMAN EVENTs (Dec. 5, 2008),
http://humanevents.com/2008/12/05/justice-alito-pokes-fun-of-biden-at-dinner (last visited
Aug. 23, 2014).
294 2011 National Lanyers Convention Schedule, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-
soc.org/events/page/2011-national-lawyers-convention-schedule (last visited Aug. 23, 2014)
(noting that the justices would be introduced by the Hons. Edwin Meese III and C. Boyden
Gray, and that audio/video would not be available). The Federalist Society's website describes
itself as seeking to "reorder[] priorities within the legal system to place a premium on individual
liberty, traditional values, and the rule of law." About Us, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY,
http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). "In working to achieve these
goals," the website states, "the Society has created a conservative and libertarian intellectual
network that extends to all levels of the legal community." Id. Thus, there is hardly any question
but that the organization is political in nature.
295 See Mike Dennison, Scalia to Federalist Socie_*y: Court Shouldn't 'nvent New Minorities,"
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Federalist Society members during such trips. 296
When the justices engage in these activities, it as though they have
utterly abandoned the judicial ideal dating from the Constitution and
embodied in both the ABA Model Code and the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges. The justices know they are engaging in political
activity, they are undoubtedly aware of the criticism, they choose to do
it anyway, and they choose not to place any limitations on themselves.
So it becomes difficult to understand how they imagine any of their de-
cisions cannot reasonably be questioned as partial, at least in the sense
of openmindedness. Indeed, their political behavior has now turned
the notion of impartiality on its head: the public is more surprised when
a justice does something politically unexpected. The Court itself has be-
come a walking, talking, daily violation of Caperton.
This should change. The Supreme Court's behavior in this respect
gives license to courts who would behave politically, judge politically,
and then simply pretend otherwise when the public complains that they
are not impartial. 29 ' And if there is any doubt whether the state and
MISSOULIAN, Aug. 19, 2013, available at http://missouhan.com/news/state-and-regional/scalia-
to-federalist-society-court-shouldn-t-invent-new-minorities/article_083f2eb6-0922-1 le3-850c-
001a4bcf887a.html.
296 See E-mail from Faculty Advisor to Texas A&M University School of Law Federalist So-
ciety, to faculty (May 3, 2013, 11:47 CST) (on file with author) ("ten of our Federalist Society
students have been invited to an informal tete-a-tete with Justice Antonin Scalia during his visit
to Fort Worth this week. The students (and 1) will be part of a fairly small group that will have
a chance to chat with the Justice during a two-hour hors d'oeurve session at the Fort Worth
Club. This will be a press-free event so the students will get a chance to hear candidly from the
justice about any number of things."). More recently, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg have been
giving speeches and interviews touching directly on issues highly likely to reach the Court. See
Valerie Richardson, Scalia Defends Keeping God, Religion in Public Square, THE WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2014, available at http://www.washingtonimes.com/news/2014/oct/1/justice-antonin-scalia-
defends-keeping-god-religio/?page=l (quoting Justice Scalia as saying in speech at Colorado
Christian University that "secularists" are wrong when they argue "that the separation of
church and state means that the government cannot favor religion over non-religion"); Cristian
Faias, Will Congress Accept Ruth Bader Ginsbug's Challenge?, TH E NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 2015,
available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121088/ruth-bader-ginsburg-our-congress-
not-functioning-very-well (reporting Justice Ginsburg's criticism of those relying on the "color-
blindness" concept in affirmative action); Jeffrey Rosen, Rutb Bader Ginsburg is an American Hem,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 2014, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119578/
ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-retirement-feminists-jazzercise (quoting Justice Ginsburg as say-
ing Texas' abortion statute (that is being challenged in pending federal litigation) limits women's
access to abortion and thus shows that state legislatures cannot be trusted with reproductive
rights).
297 Charles Gardner Geyh, The Political Transformation of the American Judiiag, in POUND INST.,
THE WAR ON THE JUDICIARY: CAN INDEPENDENT JUDGING SURVIVE? REPORT OF THE 2013
2015] JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
lower courts turn to the Supreme Court as an example, one need look
only to the judges in Wisconsin and Michigan who are feverishly invok-
ing the Supreme Court's policies to avoid fuller review.298 Or perhaps
at the senior federal district judge who thought it appropriate on his
blog to suggest the Justices "shut the fuck up.,,
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In the meantime, there are judges all across the country who, every
day, adapt their lives to their professional call and refrain from political
activity that might otherwise appeal to them because to do otherwise
would reflect poorly on the judiciary as an institution. Not only do they
not attend pricey dinners, accept "achievement" awards from political
organizations, go on book tours, and vacation with parties appearing
before them, but they actively avoid becoming enmeshed in such situa-
tions. With Caperton those judges accept an additional limitation that
has been given constitutional dimension: that they conduct themselves
in such a way that their impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned.
But if the high Court itself cannot show some humility and rein itself
FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES (2014) (judicial ethics expert ,Charles Gardner
Geyh, recently warned of the judiciary's tendency to pretend its impartiality, "If the legal estab-
lishment persists in making arguments the public regards as counter- factual, it could erode pub-
lie support for an independent judiciary over the long term."). More recently, Justices Scalia
and Ginsburg have been giving speeches and interviews touching directly on issues highly likely
to reach the Court. See Valerie Richardson, Scalia Defends Keeping Cod, Rei'gion in Public Square,
THE WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2014, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014
/oct/1/justice-antonin-scalia-defends-keeping-god-reigio/?page=l (quoting Justice Scalia as
saying in speech at Colorado Christian University that "secularists" are wrong when they argue
"that the separation of church and state means that the government cannot favor religion over
non-religion"); Cristian Farias, Will Congress Accept Ruth Bader Ginsbug's Challenge, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 2015, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/l 21088/ruth-bader-
ginsburg-our-congress-not-functioning-very-well (reporting Justice Ginsburg's criticism of tho-
se relying on the "colorblindness" concept in affirmative action); Jeffrey Rosen, Ruth Bader Gins-
burg is an American Hero, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 2014, available at http://www.newrep
ublic.com/article/119578/ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-retirement- feminists-jazzercise (quot-
ing Justice Ginsburg as saying Texas' abortion statute (that is being challenged in pending fed-
eral litigation) limits women's access to abortion and thus shows that state legislatures cannot
be trusted with reproductive rights).
298 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; see also Peterson v. Borst, 784 N.E.2d 934,
937 (Ind. 2003) (Boehm, J.) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824,
837-38 (1972), on purported "duty to sit")); Noriega Rodriguez v. Hernandez Colon, 20 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 285, 293-94 (P.R. 1988) (discussing United States Supreme Court practice).
299 Richard G. Kopf, Remembering Alexander Bickel's Passive Virtues and the Hobs Lobbj cases,
HERCULES AND THE UMPIRE July 5, 2014 available at http://herculesandtheumpire.com/2014/0
7/05/remembering-alexander-bickels-passive-virtues-and-the-hobby-lobby-cases ("the Court is
now causing more harm (division) to our democracy than good by deciding hot button cases
that the Court has the power to avoid. As the kids say, it is time for the Court to stfu.").
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in, the lower courts are unlikely to as well.
CONCLUSION
The Caperton decision landed just as a number of politicizing
events-particularly the influx of special interest money and the elimi-
nation of campaign restrictions-converged on the judiciary. In its first
five years, it has proved a capable counter, giving rise to stricter recusal
rules and holding judges to a more objective and honest look at their
potential for bias. For that trend to continue, however-and the pub-
lic's disapproval to turn around-the nation's highest court must com-
mit to the Caperton ideal. The justices should begin treating themselves
as every other judge in the nation is treated: recusing themselves when-
ever their impartiality is in question, allowing an objective review of
their recusal decisions, and avoiding political activity that inflames the
public sense of bias rather than relieves it.
